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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER TREATIES ON 
TRANSBOUDARY WATER CONFLICTS  
A STUDY FOCUSED ON LARGE TRANSBOUNDARY LAKES 
 
by 
Victoria Lubner 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Jenny Kehl  
 
Lakes are the largest reservoir of available surface freshwater on Earth, 
representing an irreplaceable ecosystem, essential for all life.  Despite the crucial need for 
these lakes, there has been minimal research focused on their health and security. There 
are over 1,600 transboundary lakes worldwide, which do not follow political borders and 
thus result in governance and management challenges. International water treaties have 
been cited to be a main mechanism for cooperation between riparian countries. This study 
researches the impact of international water treaties as well as economic, political, and 
environmental variables on transboundary water conflict between riparian countries of 
the 35 largest transboundary lakes.  The goal is to understand if the implementation of an 
international water treaty impacts the occurrence of conflict between riparian countries of 
large transboundary lakes. Datasets were created from existing international water treaty 
and conflict databases focused on transboundary waters.  The created datasets were used 
to analyze the relationship between treaties and conflicts on a primary focus, annual, and 
lake basis. Furthermore, an event analysis of case studies was completed for each lake.  
There were 52 international water treaties, focused on joint management, water quality, 
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and water quantity implemented between 1990 and 2013. Between 1990 and 2013, 53 
international water conflicts occurred with the primary focuses of water quantity and 
border issues. The content of the treaty is an essential aspect to understand the 
effectiveness of preventing conflict after implementation; the majority, 28, of the 53 
conflicts that occurred after a treaty was implemented were not related to the content of 
that treaty. The majority of the international lake treaties lack vital components for 
successful compliance including enforcement, conflict resolution, and monitoring. 
Overall, the implementation of a treaty does not result in a disappearance of conflict 
between riparian countries.  The specific details of the treaty, as they relate to conflicts 
are the best indicators of successful and effective compliance of the treaties.   
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1.0 Introduction 
Lakes represent unique ecosystems containing large volumes of water vital for a 
variety of human uses and biological services. Over 27 million natural lakes exist with a 
surface area over one hectare (ha) and a half million artificial lakes with a surface area 
over one ha (Texas State University 2014). The total volume of these lakes accounts for 
almost 70 percent of the available surface freshwater on the earth (ICA Report 2014).   
Despite the large volume of water stored in lakes, there has been little attention 
paid to understanding their health and security. Looking to the future, humanity will not 
be able to continue their high rate of consumption and minimal knowledge of lakes. A 
greater understanding of the health, uses, and security of natural and artificial lakes are 
necessary, since the water is used for drinking, irrigation, navigation, fishing, and 
recreation.  Due to the lack of knowledge regarding large lakes, it is imperative to 
conduct research with the goal to obtain data on these lakes, especially transboundary 
lakes.  Missing data includes, water quality, retention rates, and uses which are essential 
for successful management and protection of the world’s lakes.  A lack of equitable water 
management has the potential to cause increased inequalities and increased water 
insecurity (UN Water 2008).   
Due to the fact that lakes are used for a wider range of human activities than 
almost any other freshwater ecosystem, lakes are more susceptible to conflict.  It is 
crucial to study the relationship between international water treaties and international 
water conflict between riparian countries to understand the impact of treaties. Research 
shows international treaties have the ability to decrease conflict and promote cooperation 
between otherwise hostile riparian countries (Yoffe et al. 2003, de Stefano et al. 2010, 
Barnaby 2009, Brochmann and Hensel 2009, Wolf et al. 2003 and Wolf 1997). 
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Furthermore, “the record of acute conflict over international water resources is 
overwhelmed by the record of cooperation” (Wolf et al. 2003).   
The goal of this study was to use quantitative data to determine the impact of 
international water treaties on international water conflict between riparian countries of 
large transboundary lakes.  Additionally, this study explored the impact of economic, 
political, and environmental on international water conflict. This is a quantitative study 
analyzing if transboundary water treaties are a pathway for decreased conflict between 
riparian countries.  The content of conflicts and treaties, the strengths and weaknesses of 
the treaties, and the effect of political, economic, and environmental variables have on 
conflict are explored.    
2.0 Project Specification  
Treaties are an essential part of the governance of transboundary lakes, since 
they lessen the effects of conflicts and increase cooperation between riparian countries 
(Brochmann and Hensel 2009, Wolf et al. 2003 and Wolf 1997). When cooperation is 
established through treaties, it will be resilient even between hostile countries (Wolf 
1997). In order to understand the relationship between international water treaties and 
international water conflicts regarding large transboundary lakes, this study collected data 
on treaties, conflicts, and contextual variable from a variety of sources between 1990 and 
2013.  Existing databases were used to extract information on international water treaties 
and international water conflicts to create a treaty dataset and conflict dataset. Annual 
data on the following contextual variables were included: population growth, GDP per 
capita, GINI Index, political stability, voice and accountability, total water per capita, 
precipitation, and external water dependence. These variables have been cited to impact 
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the likelihood of environmental conflict, therefore, were included to increase the 
understanding that international water treaties have on transboundary water conflict 
(Brochman and Gleditsch 2012; Brochmann 2012; Zawahri and Mitchell 2010; Miquel et 
al. 2004; Bernauer et al. 2012; Hauge and Ellinsgen 1998). Furthermore, including 
contextual variables would allow to compare the impact of international water treaties on 
the likelihood of transboundary conflict of large lakes.  After the collection of data, 
qualitative and quantitative analyses were completed to understand the relationship 
between international water treaties and international water conflicts. Treaty and conflict 
data were analyzed annually, by primary focus, lake, relationship to one another, content 
of the treaty, and region. Furthermore, a logistic regression was completed to understand 
if the chosen contextual variables increased or decreased in odds of conflict occurring 
and compared to the impact of international water treaty implementation.  
3.0 Literature Review 
Serving industry, municipalities, agriculture, ecosystems, households, and 
energy, water is vital for life.  “Human well-being, ecosystem health and functions, even 
economics and politics all depend on how much, when, and where water is available” 
(Gleick 2000).  Water ignores political boundaries and fluctuates in time and space 
depending on climate and use.  The fact that water is tied to everything, results in water 
as the mechanism that is capable of bringing countries together when nothing else will 
(Wolf 2007).  
While 71 percent of Earth is covered with surface water, 97.5 percent is salt 
water; leaving a mere 2.5 percent to be freshwater. (USGS 2014a).  Lakes contain 67.5 
percent of the total available surface freshwater in the world (Figure 1), resulting in lakes 
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as the largest source of available surface freshwater on Earth (Global Water Security 
2012). There is an estimated 27 million natural lakes with a surface area larger than one 
hectare (ha) and 0.5 million artificial lakes with a surface area larger than one ha (TWAP 
2014).  
 
Figure 1: Water distribution on Earth. Source: ICA Global Water Security Report 2012 
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One weakness of the current literature on transboundary waterbodies is the lack 
of research conducted on transboundary lakes, reservoirs, and aquifers.  Transboundary 
waters research has focused on rivers, potentially due to the fact that rivers are the main 
source of available freshwater for human use (USGSb 2014).  Research needs to be 
conducted on transboundary lakes, because lakes are the largest reservoir of available 
surface freshwater (USGSb 2014). Overall, there is a lack of data regarding international 
transboundary lake management as well as data on water quantity and water quality.  
There is also minimal work completed analyzing the effectiveness of international water 
treaties implemented regarding large transboundary lakes on increasing cooperation and 
decreasing conflict.  
3.1 Transboundary Lakes 
Transboundary waters, lakes, reservoirs, streams, rivers, or aquifers, are referred 
to water that crosses between, or is shared by, nations, sub-national political units, 
economic sectors, or interests (Beach et al. 2000). This study will explore transboundary 
lakes that are shared by multiple countries. Transboundary waterbodies cover 70 percent 
of the Earth’s surface (TWAP 2014). There are more than 1,600 transboundary lakes, 455 
transboundary aquifers, 276 transboundary rivers, and 55 large marine ecosystems 
worldwide (Figure 2) (TWAP 2014).  More than 40 percent of the world’s population 
lives in a transboundary water basin (Watkins 2006). Transboundary waterbodies have 
increased over time due to new countries; in 1978 there were 214 international river 
basins and in 2006 there were 263 international river basins (MacQuarrie et al. 2008). 
There are approximately 145 countries located in transboundary river basins and over 30 
countries located completely within transboundary water basins (Watkins 2006).  
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Few studies have been completed on large lakes, especially in regards to 
international water treaties and international water conflict. The majority of previous 
studies have focused on the physical aspects of lakes, such as water quality. Texas State 
University started the Transboundary Water Assessment Programme (TWAP) to address 
the lack of a comprehensive assessment of transboundary waterbodies. TWAP set out to 
conduct the first global assessment of transboundary waters: groundwater, 
lakes/reservoirs, rivers, large marine ecosystems, and the open ocean.  The TWAP’s, led 
by the International Lake Environment Committee (ILEC) with national, regional, and 
international organizations, goal is to provide a comparative assessment of the current 
state of transboundary waters using existing data and stakeholder information (TWAP 
2014). The TWAP includes 159 transboundary lakes and reservoirs which are eligible for 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funding and 47 lakes and reservoirs not eligible for 
GEF funding. In total, TWAP collects and analyzes date for 206 lakes and reservoirs.  
Figure 2: Location of transboundary water systems. Source: TWAP 2014 
7 
 
 
 
GEF is a partnership for international cooperation where 183 countries work with 
institutions, civil society organizations, and private companies to address global 
environmental issues (GEF 2013). While the goal of the project is to guide GEF and other 
organizations on how to properly allocate funding for management and conservation, the 
project concluded there is a “lack of systematized data on a global scale” regarding 
transboundary waterbodies (TWAP 2014).  Due to the minimal data found on lakes and 
reservoirs, a GIS based analyses is the primary output of the study, scheduled to be 
released in mid-2015. 
Another study that attempts to research the importance of international lakes is 
the Lake Basin Management Initiative (LBMI).  In 2002, GEF approved a $1.5 million 
project titled “Towards a Lake Basin Management Initiative: Sharing Lessons for GEF 
and non-GEF Lake Basin Management Projects”.  Carried out by ILEC and LakeNet, this 
project produced 28 policy briefs, each on a different lake system (LakeNet 2004). The 
goal of the project was to “strengthen the capacity for improved lake and reservoir basin 
management at the local, basin, national, and global levels” (LakeNet 2004). While the 
policy briefs allowed for sharing of information between management leaders, LBMI’s 
reports were inconsistent.  Some reports gave detailed information on the pollution, 
primarily nitrogen and phosphorus of the lakes (i.e. Lake Victoria), while other reports 
only alluded to potential sources of pollution and contained no quantitative data. 
Inconsistency in data collection and reporting has the potential to result in different 
perspectives on effective water management. For example, when there is a minimal data 
reported on pollution concentrations in a lake, correct management procedures will not be 
taken to reduce pollution since the level of contamination is unknown. There needs to be 
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standard data collection to ensure effective management procedures are taken for all 
waterbodies.  
The “Second Assessment of Transboundary Rivers, Lakes, and Groundwaters” 
studies the transboundary water bodies in Europe and Asia in the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) region. Forty percent of this area is covered 
by transboundary waters and encompasses more than 50 percent of the European and 
Asian population of UNECE (Lipponen et al. 2011). The goal of the report is to give an 
up-to-date overview of the status of transboundary waters in the UNECE region. It 
presents an analysis of pressures on supply, the status of quality and quantity, 
transboundary impacts and future predictions (Lipponen et al. 2011). While this report is 
detailed for the lakes studied, it does not provide a global assessment of transboundary 
lakes. 
Transboundary lakes provide numerous challenges for management and 
governance. One reason is transboundary waters do not follow political boundaries. 
Transboundary water resources are under stress as a result of poor implementation of 
management practices, increased pollution, overexploitation, unsustainable water 
consumption, and low efficiency of water use (Uitto and Duda 2002). As water scarcity 
becomes more prevalent with a changing climate, water management will need to adapt 
to maintain a sustainable freshwater supply. 
3.2 Neo-Malthusians, Cornucopians, and Neo-Institutionalists  
Neo-malthusians, cornucopians, and neo-institutionalists are three viewpoints on 
resource scarcity.  Neo-malthusians claim that there are finite limits to natural resource 
and once these limits are passed widespread poverty and social breakdown will occur (El-
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Anis 2013). Environmental scarcity is seen as a direct threat to security since 
venvironmental scarcity will increase frustration and create grievances against the state 
(Bernauer et al. 2012).  Cornucopians are resource optimists, acknowledging that 
environmental degradation periodically challenges human well-being, but they argue 
humans have the capacity to adapt to resources scarcities primarily with technology 
(Bernauer et al. 2012). Third, liberal institutionalists believe there is capacity in 
institutions to govern resource scarcities.  Institutions encourage conservation, resource 
distribution, and the development of alternative sources of scare resources (El-Anis 
2013). Overall, “neo-malthusians have regularly predicted water wars while cornucopians 
have argued that there is no inherent scarcity and liberal institutionalists have seen 
cooperation as more likely outcome of competition for limited water resources than 
violent conflict” (Brochmann and Gledistsh 2012).  
3.3 Treaties  
As stated above, transboundary lakes are a challenge to govern resulting in the 
lack of a global governing organization or document that is effective. With numerous 
countries, communities, and tribes using the same resource with different perspectives on 
the most effective way to govern the resource, transboundary waters have been believed 
to be associated with international conflicts (Hensel 2008). The variation in regulatory 
frameworks between countries results in the challenge of efficient and successful 
resource management. Political boundaries rarely follow the same pathway as 
watersheds, resulting in difficulties when creating effective water policy (Gleick et al. 
2012).  International water treaties may be a solution for effective governance of these 
vital resources.  
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On August 17, 2014, the Convention on the Non-Navigation of International 
Water Sources was ratified by 35 states and entered into force. The Convention, 
originally created in 1997, has the purpose of governing transboundary freshwater 
resources, groundwater, rivers, and lakes (Mohamdo 2003).  The Convention provides a 
framework focusing on the equitable and reasonable use of water, including prohibiting 
causing significant harm to other users of the transboundary water (Mohamdo 2003). 
Furthermore, Article 10 of the Convention states if a conflict is to occur it will be 
resolved depending on the situation (Mohamdo 2003). While the Convention is a step in 
the right direction to establishing international water policy, it has been criticized for 
being vague resulting in limited direction for the governance of transboundary 
waterbodies (Beaumont 2000). The Convention lacks practical guidelines for water 
allocations which is the primary focus of most water conflicts (Beaumont 2000). 
Furthermore, there is a lack of enforceable international guidelines for transboundary 
lakes.  The Convention is the first and only agreement on the governance of lakes, 
groundwater, and rivers.   
Oregon State University (OSU) Department of Geosciences took on the 
challenge of analyzing cooperation verses conflict for transboundary water bodies, 
focusing on rivers. Their research project, Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database 
(TFDD), focused on quantifying the cooperation and conflict events on a scale from 
positive seven to negative seven, known as the BAR scale. Negative seven is considered 
the most conflictive event – formal declaration of war and positive seven is considered 
the most cooperative event – a formal formation of a treaty or agreement (Yoffe et al. 
2003).  TFDD concluded there were more than 400 water related treaties and agreements 
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enacted between 1820 and 2007 (Yoffe et al. 2003). The treaties analyzed correspond to 
“water as a scarce or consumable resource, a quantity to be managed, or an ecosystem to 
be improved or maintained” as well as focused on water rights, water allocation, water 
pollution, food control, and general environmental issues (Wolf 1997). Therefore, treaties 
focused on navigation rights and tariffs, fishing rights, and the delineation of river were 
excluded. Groundwater is often left out of international transboundary water agreements. 
When groundwater is mentioned in the treaty it is usually in regards to contamination and 
not water use or allocation (Gleick 2012). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) identified more than 3,600 water related treaties regarding international water 
bodies from 805 AD to 1984, most focused on navigation (FAO 1987 and 1984).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the TFDD project during the 20th century 145 treaties regarding 
transboundary waters were negotiated. The primary focus of water supply and 
hydropower accounted for 110 of the 145 treaties analyzed (Wolf 1997 and Hamner and 
Wolf 1998) (Figure 4).  Another important conclusion is 80 percent of the treaties have 
Figure 3: Number of treaties per international river basin. Source: Chalecki et al. 2002 
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no enforcement mechanism and only 54 percent of the treaties provide some type of 
monitoring (Wolf 1997). If enforcement or monitoring was included in the treaty, it was 
rudimentary (Gleick et al. 2012; Hamner and Wolf 1998). Additionally, 86 percent of the 
treaties are bilateral leaving only 14 percent to be multilateral.  It is alarming that such a 
low percentage of treaties are multilateral when the majority of the river basins analyzed 
have multiple riparian countries, leading to a lack of comprehensive water management 
between riparian countries in the basin (Wolf 1997).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the lack of monitoring mechanisms and the majority of treaties being 
bilateral in the OSU TFDD project, treaties have been shown to allow prior hostile 
countries to cooperate (Wolf et al. 2003).  Overall, “international relations over 
freshwater resources were overwhelmingly cooperative and covered a wide range of 
issues, including water quantity, water quality, joint management and hydropower” 
(Yoffe et al. 2003). Once cooperation has been established between riparians through 
Figure 4: Percent of water treaties by category. Source: Human Development Report 2006 
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treaties, they are resilient over time (Yoffe et al. 2003, de Stefano et al. 2010, Barnaby 
2009, Brochmann 2012, Brochmann and Hensel 2009, Wolf et al. 2003 and Wolf 1997).  
Wolf et al. (2003) concluded that cooperation has dominated conflict in transboundary 
rivers in the last 100 years mostly from the signing and implementation of treaties. 
Between 1948 and 1999, 1,831 water events were recorded, both conflictive and 
cooperative.  Of these events, only 28 percent were conflictive, while 67 percent were 
cooperative and four percent were neutral (Yoffe et al. 2003). 
Existing treaties play an essential role in peaceful management as well as mitigate 
the effects of conflicts (Brochmann 2012, Brochmann and Hensel 2009, Zawahri and 
Mitchell 2011, de Stefano et al. 2010). In addition to treaties, there are other factors that 
will lead countries to cooperate and not participate in conflict. The quality of the 
relationship between the countries, the political regime of the countries, and the 
geographical typology of the water body all have an impact on whether countries will 
experience cooperation or conflict (de Stefano et al 2010).   
Water quantity in transboundary lakes will decrease as a result of climate change 
as well as increased population growth creating a greater demand in the water, which will 
lead to potential water conflicts (Wilner 2005).  Poverty, low levels of health and 
education, and high population growth have been linked to cause an increase in conflict 
(Klare et al. 2009).  The United Nations estimates 300 potential conflicts over water exist 
in the world today, calculated by the number of transboundary river systems in the world 
(Klare et al. 2009). Water has already been used to achieve military and political goals, as 
well as water systems and infrastructure being the target of military attacks (Gleick et al. 
14 
 
 
 
2012). The Vice President of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin, stated “the wars of the 
next century will be over water” in the New York Times in 1995 (Gleick et al. 2012).  
As water scarcity increases there will be little room for conflict resolution and 
management between riparians (Wilner 2005).  Of the 145 treaties documented the 
TFDD project, only 52 treaties address conflict resolution with the involved parties’ 
governments. Of the remaining treaties, 14 refer disputes to a third party, and 59 treaties 
either have no conflict resolution or are incomplete regarding dispute resolution methods 
(Hamner and Wolf 1998). “Establishing an international legal framework for resource 
and water conflict management is indeed a very difficult, and quite possibly, an 
unfeasible task” (Wilner 2005). However, as demonstrated by the TFDD project and the 
FAO treaties, an international legal framework has been successful in the past, but these 
treaties rarely include adequate conflict resolution. There has been only one water war in 
the past 4,500 years (Yoffe et al. 2003 and Wolf 1998).  
Treaties are not the only mechanism that is used to determine whether countries 
will cooperative or engage in conflict over transboundary waterbodies.  Political, 
economic, and environmental factors have been shown to have a significant impact on 
predicting the occurrence of conflict (Raliegh and Urdal 2007, Hauge and Ellingsen 
1998, Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012, and Zawahri and Mitchell 2010). Rapid and 
extreme changes in political, economic, and environmental variables have the greatest 
impact on conflict. For example, construction of a large dam on a river results in extreme 
physical change leading to an increase in conflict (Yoffe et al. 2003). Additionally, rapid 
changes in the governing institutions is likely to cause conflict (Wolf et al. 2003).  
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Treaties have been an integral component to cooperation between riparian 
countries in river basins, and this study researched the impact international water treaties 
had on conflict regarding large transboundary lakes. Prior research has shown there is a 
lack of global data regarding transboundary waterbodies, cooperation has dominated 
conflict regarding transboundary waterbodies, and conflict may occur over water 
resources with the predicted changes in the climate and population growth.  This study 
explored the importance of treaties between riparian countries for international 
transboundary lakes, analyzing all aspects of the treaties and the relationship to 
international water conflict.  
4.0 Research Questions  
1. Do international water treaties have an effect on international water 
conflict between riparian countries of large transboundary lakes? 
a. Is there a relationship between the main content of the treaty and 
the primary focus of the conflict? For example, if there are 
international water treaties focused on border issues are there less 
international water conflicts on border issues? 
b. When an international water conflict occurs after an international 
water treaty has been implemented is the content of the conflict 
related to the content of the treaty? 
c. Do the number of international water treaties increase over time as 
the number of international water conflict decreases? Or does the 
number of international water conflicts increase over time because 
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there is a legally binding document between the riparian countries 
therefore countries feel more empowered to take action? 
2. Do contextual variables, population growth, GDP per capita, the GINI 
index, political stability, voice and accountability, total water per capita, 
precipitation, and external water dependence, have an impact on the 
occurrence of international water conflict? 
5.0 Hypotheses  
1. International water treaties will have an impact on international water 
conflict between riparian countries of large transboundary lakes. 
a. If there is a large number of international water treaties with a 
specific primary focus, then there will be a minimal number of 
international water conflicts with that primary focus. 
b. There will be more reported conflicts after the implementation of a 
treaty unrelated to the content of the treaty than related to the 
content of the treaty.  
c. As the number of international water treaties increase the number 
of international water conflicts will decrease.  
2. Economic, political, and environmental variables will have an impact on 
international water conflict. If a lake experiences high population growth 
there will be an increase in the international water conflict. Countries with 
higher Gross Domestic Product per capita will be less likely to experience 
conflict than countries will low GDP per capita. Countries with high 
income inequality are more likely to experience conflict. Countries with 
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consistent political regime and democracy will be less likely to experience 
conflict than autocracies and a changing political regime. Countries will 
low water stress, high precipitation, and low external water dependence 
will be less likely to experience conflict.  
6.0 Methods 
The goal of this study is to use quantitative data on international water treaties 
and international water conflict to determine the impact treaties have on transboundary 
water conflict between riparian countries of large transboundary lakes. Data were 
collected on international water treaties and international water conflict creating two 
datasets; one database on international water treaties and the other database on 
international water conflict. Annual data was collected on economic, political, and 
environmental factors to determine their impact on international water conflict in 
comparison to the impact international water treaties have. 
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6.1 Transboundary Lake Selection 
 This study analyzed large transboundary lakes (saltwater and freshwater) greater than 
800 square kilometers (km2). The goal of the study was to study large transboundary 
lakes, therefore, lakes with a surface area of 800km2 or greater were chosen. 
Furthermore, since larger lakes have a higher number of riparian countries this led to a 
more dynamic analysis of country interactions. The TWAP database on transboundary 
lakes was used to compile the 35 lakes with a surface area greater than 800km2 (Figures 5 
through 9). For each lake the name, surface area, riparian countries, latitude, longitude, 
and basin were recorded (Table 2).  
LAKE SURFACE AREA (km
2
) RIPARIAN COUNTRIES BASIN
Caspian Sea 377543.20 Azerbiajan; Iran; Kazakhstan; Russia; Turkmenistan TBD
Superior 85893.7649 Canada; USA St. Lawrence
Victoria 66841.53 Kenya; Tanzania; Uganda Nile
Huron 60565.2168 Canada; USA St. Lawrence
Tanganyika 32685.45 Burundi; DR Congo; Tanzania; Zambia Congo/Zaire
Malawi/Nyasa 29429.15 Malawi; Mozambique; Tanzania Zambezi
Erie 26560.7691 Canada; USA St. Lawrence
Aral 23919.28 Kazakhstan; Uzbekistan Aral Sea
Ontario 19062.2313 Canada; USA St. Lawrence
Titicaca 7479.94 Bolivia; Peru Lake Titicaca-Poopo System
Turkana 7439.18 Ethiopia; Kenya Lake Turkana
Albert 5502.31 DR Congo; Uganda Nile
Nasser/Aswan 5362.72 Egypt; Sudan Nile
Kariba 5258.61 Zambia; Zimbabwe Zambezi
Mweru 5021.54 DR Congo; Zambia Congo/Zaire
Cahora Bassa 4347.37 Mozambique; Zambia; Zimbawe Zambezi
Xingkai/Khanka 4127.67 China; Russia Amur
Merin 3896.70 Brazil; Uruguay Lagoon Mirim
Sarygamysh 3777.69 Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan TBD
Uvs/Usba 3613.33 Mongolia; Russia Lake Ubsa-Nur
Peipsi/Chudskoe 3507.40 Estonia; Russia Narva
Lake of the Woods 2964.7634 Canada; USA Nelson-Saskatchewan
Kivu 2375.12 DR Congo; Rwanda Congo/Zaire
Edward 2231.99 DRCongo; Uganda Nile
Buenos Aires/General Carrera 1768.37 Argentina; Chile Baker
Chad 1294.61 Cameroon; Chad Lake Chad
Itaipu 1154.07 Brazil; Paraguay La Plata
St. Clair 1114.0000 Canada; USA St. Lawrence
Lago de Yacyreta 1109.41 Argentina; Paraguay La Plata
Champlain 1098.9038 Canada; USA St. Lawrence
Chilwa 1084.20 Malawi; Mozambique NA
O'Higgins/San Martin 1013.13 Argentina; Chile Pascua
Rainy Lake 852.4789 Canada; USA Nelson-Saskatchewan
Szczecin Lagoon 822.4074 Germany; Poland Oder/Odra
Zun-Torey 806.24 Mongolia; Russia Amur
Table 1: The international transboundary lakes with a surface area of 800 square kilometers or greater. The 
lake, surface area (km2), riparian countries, and basin are shown. Source: TWAP                       
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Figure 5: Transboundary lakes in Asia. 
Figure 6: Transboundary lakes in Europe. 
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Figure 7: Transboundary lakes in Africa. 
Figure 8: Transboundary lakes in North America. 
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Figure 9: Transboundary lakes in South America. 
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6.2 Data collection for International Water Treaties 
For this research study, an international water treaty is defined as a formal 
document between countries referring to water as a scare or consumable resource, a 
quantity to be managed, or an ecosystem to be improved or maintained (Hammer and 
Wolf 1998). Documents classified as treaties, agreements, revisions, conventions, and 
protocols regarding a transboundary lake were included in the international treaties 
dataset.   
Previous research studies have focused on international water treaties relating to 
water as a consumable resource, disregarding treaties relating to boundary issues, 
navigation, and fishing (de Stefano et al. 2010 and Wolf 1998).  This study considered all 
water related international treaties between riparian countries, including treaties that 
cover a large range of lakes and countries, deal with water as a consumable resource, 
boundary delineation, navigation, recreation, hydropower, fishing, wetlands, and general 
water management. This was done to encompass a larger set of international water 
treaties governing transboundary lakes, which influences the management of 
transboundary lakes. The goal was to encompass all international water treaties governing 
large transboundary lakes implemented between 1990 and 2013. This time period was 
chosen because the breakup of the Soviet Union was the last time a transboundary lake 
was created, the Aral Sea. 
The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 
report, International Water Government: Conservation of Freshwater Ecosystems was 
used to collect treaty information included in the created dataset. This report provides a 
detailed understanding of existing governance agreements for the preservation of 
freshwater ecosystems (Iza 2004). Additionally, the report provides an analysis of 
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selected international water agreements, and was searched for international water treaties 
from 1990 to 2004 regarding the transboundary lakes for data compiling.   
 The first existing database used was the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database Project (TFDD), which focuses on transboundary rivers, but also includes 
transboundary lakes.  It contains over 450 international freshwater agreements from 1820 
to 2008.  In using the TFDD, the database was first filtered by year, eliminating anything 
prior to 1990. Next, the TFDD was filtered by riparian country, removing treaties 
between countries that were not the riparians to the lakes of interest. Each treaty in the 
newly created dataset was reviewed to understand the components of the treaty. 
Additional international water treaty information was needed from 2008 to 2013 – the 
time span not covered by the TFDD.  
The two other databases utilized, FAOLEX and FAO WATER TREAITES are 
not specific to transboundary water system, and therefore, data collection was limited to 
only international water treaties involving the transboundary lakes. FAOLEX contains a 
variety of domestic and international treaties. It is a “comprehensive and up-to-date 
legislative database, one of the world’s largest electronic collections of national laws and 
regulations on food, agriculture and renewable natural resources” (FAOLEX 2014). Due 
to the wide range of treaties covered in FAOLEX, the advanced search function was used 
to select for treaties relating to water. The advanced search option was not able to filter 
domestic treaties, therefore each riparian country of the 35 transboundary lakes was used 
for the ‘words from record’ search bar. Similar to the TFDD selection process, treaties 
were included if they were between the riparian countries of a large transboundary lake 
and implemented between 1990 and 2013.  
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The FAO WATER TREATIES database “carries the full text of treaties and 
agreements, bi-lateral, multilateral, concluded by sovereign countries in regard to the 
development and management of rivers and lakes, and/or of groundwater resources, 
which from an international boundary line or which are bisected by such boundary” 
(WATER TREATIES 2014). Each riparian country was searched in WATER TREATIES 
database for the 35 large transboundary lakes of interest in the specified time span, 1990 
to 2013.  
Some treaties regarding rivers were included in our dataset, if they included a 
transboundary lake of interest. For example, The Agreement between the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Czech Republic, and the Republic of Poland on the protection 
of the Oder River from pollution was included. The Oder River discharges into the 
Szczecin Lagoon and the Szczecin Lagoon is mentioned in the Agreement, therefore the 
agreement governs the Szczecin Lagoon. International water treaties where the large 
transboundary lake was not mentioned or included in the watershed were not included in 
the dataset.  
As stated above, in order for a treaty to be included in our dataset it must be an 
international water treaty between countries who directly border the same large 
transboundary lake. For example, the Agreement between the Government of Russian 
Federation and the Government of South Africa on Water Relations and Forest 
Management in 2007 was not included since Russia and South Africa are not riparian 
countries of a transboundary lake. 
From the aforementioned databases, the following information was extracted for 
treaties between 1990 and 2013: treaty name, date signed, document type (adopted from 
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TFDD), basin name, region, primary country region, treaty basin, signatures (bilateral or 
multilateral), countries involved, geographical scope, institutional framework, primary 
focus (Table 3), strengths and weaknesses indicators (monitoring, information exchange, 
enforcement, and conflict resolution), and the source. 
Additionally, information was collected on whether the treaty contained the 
following components: water quality and pollution, water quantity, allocation, invasive 
species, hydropower, irrigation, groundwater, local needs, construction right, construction 
ban, navigation, fishing, border issues, territorial issues, alternative scenarios, prediction 
model, joint management, technical assistance, information exchange, monitoring, 
conflict resolution, financial assistance, and enforcement. If a treaty contains one or more 
of these components, the article and/or the text was recorded.  
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6.4 Data Collection for International Water Conflicts 
Conflict was defined as any form of hostility between riparian countries that was 
reported by one of the data sources for this study. The OSU Basins at Risk (BAR) scale 
and the conflict categories from the Pacific Institute were used to determine whether an 
event would be considered conflictive. The TFDD categorized water conflicts on a water 
event intensity scale; the BAR scale ranks water events from negative seven to positive 
seven (Yoffe et al. 2003). The negative events are considered conflictive events (Table 
3). While conflicts were not placed into intensity categories based on the BAR scale, the 
descriptions of the negative event categories were used to determine whether a water 
event was conflictive.  Conflicts, on an international scale, included formal declaration of 
war, military mobilization, damage to property, verbal treats showing hostility, deaths, 
and lawsuits.  
Table 2: Primary focuses of international water treaties. Source: OSU 
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Table 3: Oregon State University Water Intensity Scale: BAR Scale Source: Oregon State University 
 
 
International water conflict data were collected from 1990 to 2013. The first 
database used was the TFDD Event Database.  The TFDD Event Database contains 
conflict and cooperative events over international freshwater resources from 1948 to 
2008. The database has more than 6,400 historical events, the majority of which are 
cooperative. The Event Database was filtered for only conflictive events; meaning water 
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events with a negative BAR Scale were included. Next, conflictive events occurring 
before 1990 as well as conflictive events not regarding the large transboundary lakes of 
interest were eliminated.  
The second database for transboundary conflicts used was The Pacific Institute 
Water Conflict Chronology.  Conflicts in the Water Conflict Chronology includes intra-
national and international conflict, therefore the database was filtered for international 
conflicts. Next, the database was filtered for conflicts that occurred between riparian 
countries of the large transboundary lakes of interest between 1990 and 2013. 
The third source for international water conflicts was the online news source, 
OOSKAnews.  OOSKAnews is a collection of water related news stories which started in 
May 2006 (OOSKAnews 2014). OOSKAnews produces five subscription-based 
newsletters weekly complied from over 150 correspondents located in worldwide 
(OOSKAnews 2014). The OOSKAnews archive includes more than 20,000 water related 
news stories and is believed to be “the world’s most substantive archive of international 
water news” (OOSKAnews 2014). A limited description on reported international water 
conflicts is available online, without the paid subscription. An online subscription was 
not obtained for this study, therefore only a minimal description was available for data 
collection. 
OOSKAnews was searched by lake name without “lake”, “lago” or “sea” due to 
the large amount of unrelated results when included.  The water events that were 
determined to be conflictive by using the BAR Scale were compiled in a database. As 
with the Water Conflict Chronology and OSU Event Database, in order for a conflict to 
be included, it must be international between riparian countries, regarding one of the 
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large transboundary lakes. For example, a Malawian environmental group raised 
concerns over oil exploration in Lake Malawi is not included in this study, because it is 
not an international conflict between the riparian countries. The following data was 
recorded for each conflictive event from the databases: date, countries involved, lake, 
summary of event, non-violent or violent conflict, and primary focus of the conflict.   
6.5 Contextual Data Collection  
Annual data was collected on political, economic, and environmental variables 
that have been previously shown to impact the likelihood of conflict (Brochman and 
Gleditsch 2012; Brochmann 2012; Zawahri and Mitchell 2011; Miquel et al. 2004; 
Bernauer et al. 2012; Hauge and Ellinsgen 1998). Furthermore, the impact of 
international water treaties have on international water conflict was compared to the 
impact the contextual variables had on conflict, to determine which variables had the 
greatest impact on conflict. Contextual variables were needed to fully understand whether 
international water treaties have an effect on conflict.  Annual data were collected from 
1990 to 2013 for each riparian country of the of each transboundary lake for the 
following variables: population growth, GDP per capita, GINI index, political and 
stability, voice and accountability, total water per capita, precipitation, and external water 
dependence.   
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Table 4: The contextual variables included in this study. Components include the variable, rationale for 
using the variable, a description and definition of the variable, and the source of the data 
 
. 
 
7.0 Variable Descriptions 
7.1 Environmental Variable Total Water per capita 
There are a variety of indices created that attempt to measure water stress in a 
country. The Falkenmark indicator may be the most widely used measured of water stress 
(Brown and Matlock 2011).  The units of water stress, as used by the Falkenmark’s 
index, are cubic meters per person per year (m3/inhabitant/year). This index is typically 
used at a country scale where data is readily available (Brown and Matlock 2011), which 
makes it the ideal water stress index to use in this study. While the Falkenmark’s index is 
widely accepted as an accurate measurement of water stress, there are some short 
comings. Using national annual averages leads to generalizations of water scarcity at 
small scales. Along with not accounting for spatial variability of water resources, 
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Falkenmark’s index does not take into consideration technological or economic 
adaptability or water quality (Yoffe et al. 2003 and Brown and Matlock 2011).  
Total water resources per capita, a measurement of water stress, was collected 
from the Aquastat. Aquastat is FAO’s global water information system which was 
developed by the Land and Water Division and used for data collection of the 
environmental contextual variables. Total water resources per capita is defined as the 
“total annual actual renewable water resources per inhabitant” and is measured in cubic 
meters per inhabitant per year – the same units as Fallenmark’s index. Total water per 
capita was reported in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012. The rational for including a 
measurement of water stress is as water stress increases the likelihood of conflict 
increases (Brown and Matlock 2011). 
Table 5: Amount of available water and corresponding level of water stress. According to Falkenmark 
1,700 m3 per person per year is when water stress occurs. Source: Brown 2011 
Index (m3/person/year) Level of Water Stress 
>1,700 No Stress 
1,000 – 1,700 Stress 
500- 1,000 Scarcity 
<500 Absolute Scarcity 
 
7.2 Environmental Variable: External Water Dependence 
External water dependence, collected from Aquastat is defined as “the part of the 
country’s annual renewable water resources that are not generated in the country” 
(Aquastat 2014). This includes inflows from groundwater and surface water from 
upstream countries and part of the water of border lakes and rivers (Aquastat 2014). 
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External water dependence data was collected and reported for the following years 1992, 
1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012. External water dependence was included, because the higher 
dependency on external water resources increases the chances of cooperation in the form 
of treaties in river basins (Zawahri and Mitchell 2010).  
7.3 Environmental Variable: Precipitation 
Precipitation for this study was defined as the long-term average, over space and 
time, of annual endogenous precipitation produced in the country (Aquastat 2014). 
Precipitation data was collected from Aquastat and recorded in depth, millimeters per 
year. Data for precipitation was collected from Aquastat every five years.  Data was 
collected in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012.  
The higher the precipitation in a country, the higher the available freshwater 
resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of conflict (Zawahri and Mitchell 2010).  For 
example, higher rainfall makes civil conflicts less likely in Africa (Miquel et al. 2004). 
However, in a study completed in 2013, it was concluded warmer temperatures or more 
extreme rainfall events, defined as one standard deviations from normal, resulted in an 
increase of frequency of interpersonal violence by 4 percent and intergroup conflict by 14 
percent (Hsiang et al. 2013). Interpersonal conflict consists of murder, assault, rape, and 
domestic violence, while an intergroup conflict could be an ethnic riot (Hsiang et al. 
2013). Another study showed a similar pattern; the frequency of violent events in 
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya increase in periods of extreme rainfall variations (Raleigh 
and Kniveton 2012). Increased rain events have the potential to increase or decrease 
conflict depending on the region of study and whether it is international, civil, or 
intergroup conflict.  
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7.4 Economic Variable: Population Growth 
The World Bank’s definition of population growth is the annual percentage is the 
“exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t”, where t is equal to 
a year and is on a country level (World Bank 2014). Data was collected from the World 
Bank by country annually between 1990 and 2013. High population growth has been 
shown to increase conflict (Raleigh and Urdal 2001). 
7.5 Economic Variable: GDP per capita 
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the sum of gross value added by all residents 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products (World Bank 2014). GDP per capita is GDP divided by the 
midyear population of the country. GDP per capita was collected annually between 1990 
and 2013 from the World Bank and recorded in current US dollars. The rational for 
including GDP per capita is the wealthier the country, the less likely conflict will occur 
(Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012).  
7.6 Political Variable: Gini Coefficient 
The Gini index also known as the Gini coefficient’s goal is to display inequality 
within a country. The Gini index provides information on the extent to which 
individuals/households within an economy deviate from a perfectly equal distribution of 
wealth. It is a measure of statistical dispersion intended to represent the income 
distribution of a nation’s citizens. The scale can range from zero to 100. Zero indicates 
complete equality within the population, while 100 represents complete inequality. The 
index is calculated using a Lorenz curve, plotting the cumulative percentages of the total 
income received against the cumulative number of recipients (Figure 10). The Lorenz 
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curve starts with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area 
between the curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality.  
Data for the GINI index was collected from The Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID). The SWIID was introduced in 2008 with the goal to 
“provide researchers with income inequality data that maximize comparability for the 
broadest possible sample of countries and years” (Solt 2009) Furthermore, it attempts to 
contain as much data on the Gini index as possible from 1960 to present for 174 
countries. The Luxembourg Income Study is used as the basis for the SWIID. For the 
missing years, SWIID applies a custom missing-data algorithm to proximate missing 
annual data. The SWIID is the best suited database for cross-national research on income 
inequality when compared to other database sources (Solt 2014). Data was collected from 
the SWIID annually from 1990 to 2013. The GINI index was included because, countries 
with high income inequality are more likely to experience conflict (Hauge and Ellingsen 
Figure 10: Example of a Lorenz curve. Source: Economic Concepts. 
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1998).  
7.7 Political Variable: Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) examine six dimensions of 
governance for 215 countries from 1996 to 2013 using 32 data sources. The dimensions 
are voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Four types of data 
sources were used to compile the WGI: surveys of households and firms (9 sources), 
commercial business information providers (4 sources), non-governmental organizations 
(11 sources), and public sector organizations (8 sources) (Kaufmann et al. 2011). 
The political stability and absence of violence indicator measures perceptions of 
the likelihood that a country’s government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means. Actions may include violent demonstrations, 
government stability, ethnic tensions, civil unrest, and terrorism. Data was collected 
annually starting in 1996, when WGI started. However,  the following years had no data 
1997, 1999, and 2001. Political stability was included as a indicator because countries 
containing a consistent type of regime are less likely to experience conflict (Hauge and 
Ellingsen 1998). 
7.8 Political Variable: Voice and Accountability 
The voice and accountability indicators measures perceptions of the extent of a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their governments. Additionally, this 
WGI measures freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. As with 
political stability, data was not reported prior to 1996, in 1997, 1999, and 2001.  
The rational for included voice and accountability is Mansfield et al. (2002), 
concluded that countries with democracies are more likely to cooperate with other 
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countries with democracies, than countries without democracies. Furthermore, Zawahri 
and Mitchell (2010) concluded, that when states with democracies participate in 
negotiation, there is an increase in trust between the two countries resulting in an increase 
in the willingness to fulfill contractual commitments.  
8.0 Analysis: 
After data on international water treaties, international water conflicts, and the 
contextual variables were collected for all 35 transboundary lakes from 1990 to 2013, 
various analyses were performed to determine if implementing an international water 
treaty has an impact on international water conflicts. Graphs were created to determine 
the relationship on an annual, regional, lake, and content basis. The following indicators 
were used to evaluate the overall strengths and weaknesses of large transboundary lake 
treaties: monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and information exchange. These 
percentages of these indicators were then compared to previous data by Wolf (1998).  
An event analysis in the form of a case study was completed for each large 
transboundary lake to further understand the relationship between the international water 
treaties implemented and international water conflicts between the riparian countries. 
Treaties and conflicts governing the transboundary lake of interest were further 
researched to determine the reason they occurred, the details of each, and the timeline 
between when conflict occurred and when a treaty was implemented.  The case studies 
provided a comprehensive overview of each of the international water treaties and the 
international water conflict between 1990 and 2013.  
Using the patterns observed in the case studies, conflicts were placed into three 
different categories. These categories were based on the content of the conflict as it 
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relates to a treaty implemented regarding a large transboundary lake. The first category 
includes international water conflicts that occurred prior to the implementation of an 
international water treaty. For example, conflicts between Egypt and Sudan regarding 
Lake Nasser occurred before an international water treaty was implemented during the 
time frame of this study.   
The second category encompasses conflicts that occurred after the 
implementation of an international water treaty and are related to the content of the 
treaty. For example, in 2009 there was an international water conflict between the 
riparian countries of Lake Victoria with a primary focus of water quality. In 2003, the 
Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria was implemented containing a 
“polluter pays principle” and water quality components; therefore the 2009 conflict 
regarding Lake Victoria was placed into the second category since the content of the 
conflict was related to the content of a treaty implemented prior.  
The third category includes conflicts that occurred after the implementation of an 
international water treaty and are not related to the content of the treaty. For example, 
numerous international water conflicts occurred between Tanzania and Malawi regarding 
the border of Lake Malawi in 2012 and 2013.  Between 1990 and 2013, no international 
water treaties were implemented regarding the border of Lake Malawi; therefore, the 
conflicts regarding border issues were placed in the third category.  
One international water conflict was counted twice in this analysis. In 2012, 
Paraguay threatened to shut off energy supply produced by hydroelectric dams in Lake 
Itaipu and Lago de Yacyreta to neighboring counties. Since the international water treaty, 
Agreement of the Exchange of Notes on Creating a Security Zone Thousand Meters 
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Downstream and Upstream for the Entirety of the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Dam, was 
implemented in 2001, the conflict in 2012 was placed into the second category for Lago 
de Yacyreta, since it is related to the content of the treaty. However, this international 
water conflict is also regarding Lake Itaipu; since there was no international water treaty 
implemented prior to 2012 regarding hydroelectricity in Lake Itaipu this conflict was 
placed in the third category. 
To understand the relationship between the contextual variables, water treaties, 
and water conflicts logistic regression was completed. Logit regression was the chosen 
method since it is an appropriate method when the dependent variable, the presence of 
conflicts annually, is binary. In this study the dependent variable is the presence of 
international water conflict between riparian countries, a binary variable.   A “0” 
represents the absence of conflict and “1” represents the presence of conflict in a given 
year. 
Logistic regression displays how closely the relationship between the dependent 
variable, presence of conflict, and the independent variables fits the non-linear 
relationship (Pollock 2012). Furthermore, logistic regression was chosen since the 
independent variables in this study are a mixture of continuous and categorical (Wuensch 
2014). Overall, the goal was to determine how well the economic, political, and 
environmental variables predict the probability of international water conflict occurring.  
Data was collected on a variety of contextual variables, including political, 
economic, and environmental variables all of which have been cited to have an impact on 
environmental conflict. The contextual variables, population growth, GDP per capita, 
GINI index, political stability, voice and accountability, total water per capita, 
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precipitation, and external water dependence were collected on a country level. To 
convert the country level data to represent a transboundary lake of interest, the riparian 
countries of a lake were average annually for each variable. For example, the population 
growth of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan were averaged for 
1990 to represent the population growth of the Caspian Sea in 1990.  
Data imputation of incomplete datasets was necessary to run the logistic 
regression to understand the effect international water treaties have on international water 
conflict.  It is important to note that when data imputation occurred, only data from the 
same large transboundary lake was used. The average population growth and the average 
GDP per capita were collected from the World Bank and contained full datasets; 
therefore, data imputation was not needed for average population growth or GDP per 
capita.  
The average Gini index contained missing years. If a large transboundary lake 
was missing data for a particular year, the previous year was used. If there was not 
reported data for 1990, the value from 1991 was used. In general, if a large transboundary 
lake was missing day the year prior or after was used to complete the data set.  
The indicators, political stability and voice and accountability had missing data 
prior to 1996 and in 1997, 1999, and 2001. For the following years: 1990, 1991, 1992, 
1993, 1994, and 1995 the reported WGI in 1996 was used to complete the dataset. For 
1997, 1999, and 2001, the mean of the year before and after was used to calculate the 
missing values. For example, the reported value of political stability in 1996 and 1998 
were used to calculate the missing value in 1997 for political stability. It is important to 
note only values used were from the same transboundary lake.   
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Average water per capita, precipitation, and external water dependence were 
collected from Aquastat by country; Aquastat reports these variables every 5 years. The 
following years were missing data from the three environmental variables: 1990, 1991, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, and 2013. For 1990 and 1991, the reported value in 1992 was used. For the other 
missing years, a formula was created to impute data using a gradual change, increase or 
decrease depending on the change in reported value every 5 years for total water per 
capita. There was no variation between the reported values by Aquastat from external 
water dependence and precipitation; therefore, for the missing years of data the one 
reported value was used.   
9.0 Case Studies 
In order to understand the content of the international water treaties implemented 
between 1990 and 2013 and the international water conflicts, each were explored in 
depth. A case study on the international water treaties and international water conflict 
which occurred between the riparian countries was completed for each large 
transboundary lake.                                                
9.1 Caspian Sea 
In 1992, a treaty was signed between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the 
Russian Federation concerning the protection of transboundary waters, including the 
Caspian Sea. It is unclear whether this treaty was in response to conflict before 1900 
regarding the Caspian Sea, due to the limitation of this study - data was not collected 
before 1990.  
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An international water conflict occurred between the riparian countries of the 
Caspian Sea regarding oil extraction in 1997 (International Water Event Database). A 
variety of protest, fueled by disagreements on how to proceed with oil extraction since 
there were outstanding legal aspects of the Caspian Sea’s development, took place in 
1997. Azerbaijan wanted to divide the Caspian Sea into different national sectors, but this 
view point was not shared with other riparian countries. The varying opinions on how to 
proceed with oil extraction in the Caspian Sea led to tensions among the riparian 
countries (International Water Event Database). 
In 1998, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by Central Asian States, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  This international treaty focuses on 
the economic development of the Central Asian States. Furthermore, the signatures 
adopted a UN Special Program for the Economics of Central Asia (SPECA) (UNECE 
2014). SPECA was created to support cooperation between countries and provide 
incentives for economic development. The international water conflict in 1997 over oil 
extraction and territorial issues in the Caspian Sea may have been a trigger for the 
development of the Tashkent Declaration including SPECA. Oil extraction from the 
Caspian Sea requires cooperation between riparian countries and further economic 
development.  
In addition to the 1998 Tashkent Declaration, an agreement between Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Sphere of Hydrometeorology was signed in 
1999. The Parties agree to general cooperation including organization and exchange of 
information, prevention of dangerous natural phenomena, joint training and education of 
experts in the Sphere of Hydrometeorology (Tashkent 1998). Additionally, potentially in 
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response to oil extraction concerns, the Agreement incorporates transportation, allowing 
the transportation of fuel, food products, and instruments in and out of the region 
(Tashkent 1998).   
In 2003, the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the Caspian Sea, known as the Tehran Convention was signed by the five 
riparian countries, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russian, and Turkmenistan. The Tehran 
Convention, entered into force into 2006, aims to protect the Caspian Sea from all threats 
of pollution. Furthermore, the Tehran Convention’s goal is to restore the Caspian Sea 
ecosystem for present and further generations (UNEP 2014). While the Tehran 
Convention attempts to reduce pollution in the Caspian Sea, water quality concerns still 
remain. The Tehran Convention outlines protocols needed to be adopted to achieve the 
most comprehensive protection against pollution. To date, three protocols have been 
adopted and implemented: “Aktau” Protocol on Regional Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation in Combating Oil Pollution Incidents; the “Moscow” Protocol for the 
Protection of the Caspian Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources and Activities; 
and the “Ashgabat” Protocol for the Conservation of Biological Diversity (UNEP 2014). 
These protocols have assisted in the reduction of future conflicts over water quality.  
Two agreements were signed in 2010 regarding the Caspian Sea. First, the 
Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan on rational Management and Protection of the Water 
Resources of the Samur River was signed in 2010. This agreement determines the daily 
allocations of water in the Samur River, which affects the water quantity and water 
quality of the Caspian Sea since the Samur River directly flows into the Caspian Sea. The 
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second agreement signed in 2010 was the Agreement between the Government of the 
Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on joint 
management of transboundary waters. This agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan 
deals with the water quantity by modifying the diversion amount and water quality by 
promoting data collection (Agreement between the Government of the Russian 
Federation and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Joint Management of 
Transboundary Waters 2010). There have not been any reported international water 
conflicts during 1990 to 2013 between Russia and Kazakhstan on water quality or 
pollution concerns, displaying the effectiveness of the treaty between Kazakhstan and 
Russia regarding water quality. Furthermore, a protocol from the Tehran Convention was 
adopted by Russia, once again showing the effectiveness of implemented international 
water treaties focused on the pressing concerns of the Caspian Sea.  
There have been conflicts between the following riparian countries: Iran, 
Azerbaijan, and Russia regarding water quality. Between 2010 and 2013 three conflicts 
occurred with the primary focus of water quality especially pollution concerns 
(Ooskanews). For example, in 2010 Azerbaijan blamed Russia for being the biggest 
polluter of the Caspian Sea, while in 2010 Iran threatened to sue Azerbaijan for being the 
main source of pollution, particularly oil pollution (Ooskanews 2010; 2013). There are no 
individual treaties between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia (multilateral or bilateral) 
regarding transboundary waterbodies which may be a reason reported international water 
conflict occurs between Russia and Azerbaijan and Iran and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the 
observed international water conflict following the international water treaty 
implementation, including the Tehran Convention, could be a result of a now legally 
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binding document between the riparian countries resulting in the empowerment of 
riparian countries to take action. 
 
10.2 Lake Superior, Lake Ontario, Lake Erie and Lake Huron  
Lake Superior, Lake Ontario, Lake Huron, and Lake Erie experienced conflicts 
in 1999 and 2001 regarding water quantity. In 1999, water exports from the Great Lakes 
was a high profile issue after a United States Company sued the Canadian government for 
violating the North American Free Trade Agreement by preventing water exports 
(International Water Event Database). Furthermore, in 2001 the past president of North 
Shore Coalition, created in 1985 to represent thousands of Great Lakes residents affected 
by changing lake levels, called a 30.6 million dollar study on water levels in the Great 
Lakes “nothing but a five-year drain of taxpayers money” (International Freshwater 
Event Database).  
Potentially in response to the conflicts regarding water quantity, an act to amend 
the International Boundary Waters Treaty was signed by the United States and Canada in 
2002. The International Boundary Waters Treaty was originally signed on January 11, 
1909 to address conflicts regarding transboundary waterbodies, specifically the Great 
Lakes, between the United States and Canada (Johansen 2002). The International 
Boundary Waters Treaty Act was created to increase implementation of the Treaty as 
well as increase clarification of Treaty elements (International Boundary Waters Treaty 
Act 2002). Additionally, the Act prohibits bulk removal of boundary waters from their 
basin of origin, requires licenses for water related projects impacting water quantity, and 
provides clear sanctions and penalties for violation (International Boundary Waters 
Treaty Act 2002). A recommendation to the International Joint Commission (IJC) is 
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made in the Act to study the effects of water consumption, diversion, and removal with a 
focus on the Great Lakes (Johansen 2002).  The IJC recommended in their report, 
Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, to take action to protect the ecological 
integrity of the Great Lakes Basin. The conflicts in 1999 and 2001 regarding water 
quantity including bulk transfer of water in the Great Lakes may have sparked the Act in 
2002 prohibiting the transfer of water from the basin of origin.  
Even with the Act in 2002 to improve the International Boundary Waters Treaty 
of 1909, conflicts continued regarding water quantity in the Great Lakes. In 2004, the IJC 
voiced concerns over Waterloo’s plans to divert water from Lake Huron to Lake Erie 
(International Water Event Database). In 2005, a verbal concerned was expressed about 
the low water levels of the Great Lakes. The Great Lakes were recorded to be a foot less 
than average in 2005. The decrease in lake levels resulted from historical dredging to 
maintain the shipping channel in the St. Clair River. While this conflict is not directly 
related to diversions or bulk removal of Great Lakes it is a conflict over water quantity. It 
can be seen that the Act in 2002 did not eliminate all threats and conflicts to the water in 
the Great Lakes; further action was needed to prevent bulk diversions from the water in 
Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, Lake Superior, and Lake Huron.  
As a result of continued conflicts about Great Lakes water transfer out of the 
basin, the Great Lakes Compact was implemented in 2008. The Great Lakes Compact is 
unique between the United States and Canada, because all eight Great Lake states and 
two Canadian provinces adopted the Compact with the exact same language, the United 
States Congress ratified the Compact, and the United States President signed the 
Compact into law. The Great Lakes Compact has three key components: in-basin uses, 
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conservation and efficiency, and diversions (Great Lakes Compact 2008). In accordance 
to the Great Lakes Compact, the eight Great Lake states and two Canadian provinces of 
the Great Lakes have the opportunity to comment on all large new or increased 
consumptive uses. Furthermore, the states and provinces are committed to uniform 
reporting on water use. In responses to the conflicts to bulk water removal, out of basin 
diversions, transferring water out of the Great Lakes watershed, is prohibited under the 
Great Lakes Compact (Great Lakes Compact 2008). The Great Lakes Compact was 
implemented as a result of past conflicts threatening the security of the Great Lakes’ 
water quantity between the United States and Canada as well as other states. Conflicts in 
the Great Lakes region have resulted in comprehensive and enforceable treaties 
protecting the security of the Great Lakes’ water and the Great Lakes ecosystem.  
9.3 General African Treaties 
In 1995, two protocols on shared watercourses in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) were implemented; one protocol implemented in May 
1995 and the other in August 1995. Both protocols are focused on the general framework 
for riparian interactions and general principles for management of shared watercourses 
systems. The Protocol in May 1995 promotes the creation of river basin management 
institutions, while the Protocol in August 1995 promotes the creation of river basin 
commissions. There is no mention of creating transboundary lake organizations or 
commissions. The two protocols govern the following lakes: Lake Victoria, Lake 
Tanganyika, Lake Malawi, Lake Kariba, Lake Mweru, Lake Cahora Bassa, and Lake 
Chilwa.  
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The Revised Protocol on Shared Water Courses in the Southern African 
Development Community was signed in 2000 by numerous African countries governs 
Lake Malawi, Lake Chilwa, Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Cahora Bassa, Lake 
Mweru, and Lake Kariba. The Protocol was created recognizing that there are no regional 
conventions regulating utilization and management of resources of shared watercourses 
in the SADC (Revised Protocol on Shared Water Courses in the Southern African 
Development Community 2000). Parties should take all appropriate measures to prevent 
significant harm to other Parties, in regards to natural resources. Additionally, the 
Protocol promotes the establishment of shared watercourse agreements and promotes 
increased monitoring and harmonization of policies for planning, conserving, and 
allocating resources. Under the Protocol, Parties will exchange information, negotiate the 
possible impacts of planned measures, reduce and prevent pollution and environmental 
degradation, and obtain a discharge permit or license when needed (Revised Protocol on 
Shared Water Courses in the Southern African Development Community 2000). 
Furthermore, the 2000 Protocol created the Committee of Water Minsters who oversee 
and monitor the implementation of the Protocol, the Committee of Water Senior Officials 
who examine reports and documents, and Water Sector Coordinating unit who monitor, 
advise, organize, and manage. 
In 2003, The African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources was signed my numerous African countries.  The goals of the Convention are 
to enhance environmental protection, foster the conservation and sustainable use of 
natural resources, and to harmonize and coordinate policies in the field of natural 
resources (African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
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2003).  In regards to water management the 2003 Convention states, “Parties shall 
manage their water resources so as to maintain them at the highest possible quantitative 
and qualitative levels” (African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources 2003). Additionally, Parties must take actions to ensure the protection of 
human health against pollutants and water-borne diseases. Similar to the 2000 SADC 
Protocol, Parties must “establish and implement policies for the planning, conservation, 
management, utilization and development of underground and surface water” (African 
Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 2003). Where surface 
water, groundwater, or related ecosystems (i.e. wetlands) are transboundary, Parties are 
encouraged to develop inter-State Commissions, to promote and ensure the rational 
management and utilization of natural resources. Furthermore, if a dispute arises the 
inter-State Commission will be tasked with conflict resolution and promote inter-state 
cooperative development, management, and conservation of transboundary resources. 
The African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources governs 
the following lakes: Lake Malawi, Lake Chilwa, Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake 
Cahora Bassa, Lake Mweru, Lake Kariba, Lake Turkana, Lake Nasser, Lake Kivu, Lake 
Edward, and Lake Chad. 
9.4 Lake Victoria  
The general trend of international water treaties and international water conflicts 
regarding Lake Victoria is the implementation of treaties during the 1990s and early 
2000s and conflict from the mid-2000s to 2013. An increase in reporting in the riparian 
countries, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda may be one of the reasons for the increase in 
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conflicts seen since 2004. This includes the increase in available online resources from 
Ooskanews since 2006.  
In additional to the general African international water treaties described above, 
the riparian countries of Lake Victoria implemented other treaties to govern this precious 
resource. In 1994, the Agreement to Initiate Program to Strengthen Regional 
Coordination in Management of Resources of Lake Victoria was signed by Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Kenya.  The goal of the Agreement is to promote responsible management 
and general awareness of the pressing issues in Lake Victoria (1994). Each riparian 
country of Lake Victoria has a leadership role on a specific concern: Kenya’s focus is on 
water quality and land use; Tanzania heads the Regional Policy Steering Committee; and 
Uganda leads efforts on fisheries management and control of water hyacinth as well as 
other invasive weeds (Agreement to Initiate Program to Strengthen Regional 
Coordination in Management of Resources of Lake Victoria was signed by Uganda, 
Tanzania, and Kenya 1994). Uganda is also the seat for the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Organization created in 1994. The Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization addresses water 
quality concerns impacting fisheries. Additionally, the Organization promotes proper 
management, provides a forum for discussions, facilitates research, and evaluates the 
introduction of any non-indigenous aquatic animals or plants (Convention for the 
Establishment of the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization 1994).  
There have not been any recorded international conflicts over the fisheries in the 
Lake Victoria Basin since the creation of Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization.  Invasive 
species, the water hyacinth, Nile perch and Nile tilapia, have been a concern of Lake 
Victoria for years; however, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization has promoted 
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management, facilitated research, and monitored the fisheries resulting in no reported 
international water conflicts since 1994. The Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization has 
been successful in its duties by decreasing the impact non-native species have on Lake 
Victoria.  
In 1995, two SADC Protocols on shared watercourses were implemented as 
mentioned above. In 1999, a Treaty was signed by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, for the 
Establishment of the East African Community (EAC). The EAC is a regional 
intergovernmental organization aimed at increasing cooperation among the partner states 
in political, social, and economic fields (African Union 2014). The Treaty promotes 
cooperation between riparian countries by intergovernmental organization in order to 
decreases conflict between the Parties.  
In addition to The African Convention of Nature and Natural Resources signed 
in 2003, The Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin was signed by 
Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania in 2003 in response to the Treaty for the Establishment of 
the East African Community in 1999. The riparian countries of Lake Victoria agreed to 
cooperation in areas related to the conservation and sustainable utilization of Lake 
Victoria (Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin 2003). The 
Protocol “recognizes that water is a finite and vulnerable resources essential to sustain 
life and the environment must be managed in an integrated and holistic manner, linking 
social and economic development with protection and conservation of natural 
ecosystems” (Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin 2003). 
Furthermore, the Protocol promotes the polluter pays principle where “the person that 
causes the pollution shall as far as possible bear any costs associated with it” (Protocol 
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for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin 2003). Riparian countries are 
responsible for implementing procedures on existing facilities or constructing new 
facilities to avoid, reduce, minimize, and control pollution from facilities. It is 
encouraged to take “necessary legal, social, and economic measures to ensure that a 
polluter pays as near as possible the cost of the pollution resulting from their activities” 
(Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin 2003).  
While, the Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin of 2003 
is centered on sustainability, it is comprised of a vast number of topics. For example, the 
Protocol mentions irrigation, water quality, alternative predictions, natural disasters, and 
technical support. However, the main weakness of the Protocol is the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms (Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin 2003). The 
Protocol created the Lake Victoria Basin Commission which promotes equitable growth, 
promotes measures aimed at eradicating poverty, promotes sustainable utilization and 
management of natural resources, and monitors and evaluates compliance with polices 
(Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin 2003). While all these are 
vital components of a treaty, enforcement mechanisms of the treaty are absent, potentially 
leading to conflicts focused on water quality between riparian countries of Lake Victoria. 
For example, in 2013 it was reported that 90 percent of industries around Lake Victoria 
do not comply with discharge standards (OOSKAnews 2013c). Facilities surrounding 
Lake Victoria simply discharge directly in to the waterbody, resulting in countries to 
point figures at each and vocal concerns to be raised; no one is willing to take 
responsibility for the excessive pollution in Lake Victoria. Even with the “polluters pay 
principle” in the 2003 Protocol for Lake Victoria, there is not an absence of reported 
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international water conflict focused on water quality. There are two reasons for the 
reported conflict; the first is the lack of enforcement of the Protocol leading to conflicts; 
the second is the riparian countries now have a legally binding document resulting in 
greater reporting of international water conflicts relating to water quality.  
Uganda blamed the lack of data from each country on Lake Victoria, whether it 
is water quality or water quantity, as the major obstacle for effective basin wide 
management (Ooskanews 2010b). Monitoring is a component of the 2003 Protocol, 
however it is left to Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania to “establish water quality and 
quantity monitoring and surveillance stations and water quality and quantity control 
laboratories” (Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin 2003).  
Leaving monitoring to the riparian countries may be successful, if once again there was 
enforcement mechanisms outlined in the treaty to require riparian countries to take such 
actions.  
There is no treaty regarding Lake Victoria that is focused on the allocation of 
water or general water quantity. In 2011, Tanzania leaders accused Uganda of using 
excessive water from Lake Victoria (Ooskanews 2011). However, Tanzania changed its 
viewpoint in 2012, when Tanzania leaders wanted to push for an increase in water 
withdraw from Lake Victoria (Ooskanews 2012l). In order to avoid these water quantity 
conflicts, a treaty should be developed and implemented allocating the amount of water 
in Lake Victoria to each riparian country.  
While it not clear whether the implementation of the treaties regarding Lake 
Victoria decreased conflict between the riparian countries, since there were no reported 
conflicts in the 1990s and no treaties past 2003 when the conflicts started, it can be 
53 
 
 
 
concluded that the components lacking from the treaties, enforcement and water 
allocation resulted in conflicts between riparian countries.   
9.5 Lake Malawi 
Lake Malawi displays an interesting pattern for international water treaties and 
international water conflict. In the 1990s and early 2000s treaties, a variety of 
international water treaties were implemented. Then in 2012, a spike in conflict occurred 
with a recorded nine international water conflicts. Following similar trend, six reported 
international water conflicts occurred between the riparian countries, Malawi, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania of Lake Malawi. These conflicts focused primary on the 
border issues between Malawi and Tanzania.  Besides verbal threats and protests, legal 
action was taken by Tanzania and Malawi, who both submitted their case to the SADC 
(Ooskanews 2013h and 2013j).  An example of one of the border related conflicts 
occurred in July 2012 when Tanzania announced its plan to operate a tourist boat on Lake 
Malawi. Malawi believes Tanzania does not have a right to operate a boat on their 
property and therefore Malawi stated that Tanzania was not allowed to operate tourist 
boats (Meyer 2012).  
Disagreements between Tanzania and Malawi have occurred since colonial times 
over the border of the lake. The lake boundary was publically disputed from May 1967 to 
September 1968, and then ceased even though no resolution of the border took place 
(Mayall 1973). Malawi claims the majority of the lake based on a colonial agreement 
between Britain and Germany, the 1890 Heligolnad Agreement. This agreement states 
that the border between Malawi and Tanzania lays on the Tanzania side of the lake; 
therefore, Malawi aligns its opinions with this treaty. Since the 1890 Heligolnad 
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Agreement was implemented when Malawi and Tanzania were not independent 
countries, there is question of legitimacy of the defined border of Tanzania and Malawi in 
Lake Malawi. 
The international water border conflict between Malawi and Tanzania has been 
reignited by oil exploration and alleged encroachment of Tanzania fishing and tourist 
boats (Meyer 2012). As a result of the Heligoland Agreement, Malawi believes Tanzania 
does not have a right to operate tourist boats on Lake Malawi since they are the owners.  
Even with the high number of disputes between Tanzania and Malawi over Lake Malawi, 
President Jakaya Kikwere of Tanzania has stated war with Malawi is not a feasible option 
(Meyer 2012). Furthermore, Tanzania claims Lake Malawi belongs with all the riparian 
countries and it should be shared equally among them all.  
Between 1990 and 2013 there have been no international water treaties focused 
on the delineation of Lake Malawi’s border between Tanzania and Malawi. The four 
international water treaties which were implemented between 1990 and 2013 were 
general African treaties, which are described in an above section. Two Protocols on the 
Shared Watercourses in the SADC region were implemented in 1995. Furthermore, A 
Revised Protocol on Shared Water Courses in the SADC was implemented in 2000. 
Finally, The African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
was signed my numerous African countries in 2003. While these four general African 
treaties govern Lake Malawi, they do not contain articles defining the international 
borders in Lake Malawi. An international water treaty needs to be developed focused on 
the delineation of the border of Lake Malawi to decrease the reported conflict between 
Tanzania and Malawi.   
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9.6 Lake Tanganyika   
During the time period between 1990 and 2013 Lake Tanganyika experienced 
one international water conflict. This conflict occurred in 1998 at the end of a meeting of 
Zambia-Congo Joint Permanent Commission (International Water Event Database). 
Observations were made that there were no shared water agreements regarding Lake 
Tanganyika as well as Lake Mweru. Concerns were raised by members of the Zambia-
Congo Joint Permanent Commission about the governance and sustainability of Lake 
Tanganyika (International Water Event Database). 
Along with the four general African treaties implemented between 1990 and 
2013, the riparian countries of Lake Tanganyika implemented international water treaties 
specific to the governance of Lake Tanganyika. In 2003, the Convention on the 
Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika was signed by the riparian countries, 
Burundi, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), and Zambia. The goal 
of the treaty is to “ensure the protection and conservation of the biological diversity and 
sustainable use of the natural resources of the lake and its basin on the basis of integrated 
and cooperative management” (Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake 
Tanganyika 2003). The Convention encourages the development and implementation of 
harmonized laws and standards concerning the management of Lake Tanganyika. The 
treaty covers numerous areas regarding the joint management of Lake Tanganyika 
including, promoting sustainable fisheries management, prevention of pollution, 
prevention of sedimentation, navigation, and the conservation of biological diversity 
(Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika 2003).  
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The four general African treaties encompass a vast amount of protocols on the 
natural resources in the Parties. While these treaties are important to consider when 
determining the effectiveness of international water treaties, when a lake specific treaty is 
present it should in theory dominate the governance of the lake regarding the treaty. 
After the implementation of the Convention on the Sustainable Management of 
Lake Tanganyika in 2003, there have been no reported international water conflicts 
between the riparian countries. Additionally, after the Zambia-Congo Joint Permanent 
Commission expressed its concern with the lake of treaties regarding Lake Tanganyika, a 
treaty was implemented five years later regarding the sustainable use and management of 
Lake Tanganyika.  
9.7 Aral Sea 
The Aral Sea has a variety of reported international water conflicts and 
international water treaties implemented between 1990 and 2013. The first international 
water conflict occurred in 1991. Komsomol activists mounted night raids along irrigation 
canals in border areas to combat water poaching by other nationality groups along the 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan border and the irrigation canals diverted water from the Aral 
Sea.  
International water treaties were implemented in 1992, 1993, and 1995; the 
Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Republic of 
Uzbekistan, Republic of Tajiskistan and Turkmenistan on Cooperation in the Area of 
Joint Management, Utilization, and Protection of Interstate Water Resources, Agreement 
on Joint Activities in Addressing the Aral Sea and the Zone around the Sea Crisis, and 
the Resolution of the Heads of States of Central Asia on work of the EC of ICAS on 
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Implementation of Action Plan on Improvement of Ecological Situation in the Aral Sea 
Basin respectively. These international water treaties were not able to be located in 
English; therefore, little information is known about the specific contents.  
 The Agreement on Joint Activities in addressing the Aral Sea and the Zone 
around the Sea Crisis was signed by Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan in 1993. The Agreement is focused on improving the environment, and 
ensuring the social and economic development of the Aral Sea region while taking into 
account the global character of the Aral Sea designation.  The Agreement recognizes the 
extensive deterioration of the environment in the Aral Sea region. Furthermore, the 
Agreement promotes the rational use of the limited land and water resources, protects 
public health, and ensures water inflow to the Aral Sea. Inflow is required for sustaining 
the lower water levels which have were considered stable at the time of the Agreement. 
Through the Agreement, an Interstate Council was created and includes the riparian 
countries Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and Russia as an observer in addressing the Aral 
Sea crisis. The Interstate Council provides the required financial and technical assistance 
in water treatment, which creates the domestic and drinking water supply system in the 
region, as well as fights against desertification. 
In 1995, a Resolution of the Heads of States of Central Asia on work of the EC 
of ICAS on Implementation of Action Plan on Improvement of Ecological Situation in 
the Aral Sea Basin for the 3-5 years to come with consideration for social and economic 
development of the region was established. This Resolution’s goal is to ensure efficient 
work of Commission for Social and Economic Development, Scientific, and Technical 
and Ecological cooperation and to take into consideration the information of the President 
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of the International Fund for the Aral Sea (IFAS). The Interstate Council of the Aral Sea 
(ICAS) promotes good neighborhood relations and mutual respect fundamental 
principles. Overall, ICAS wants cooperation among the riparian countries for the entire 
basin, including riparian countries of tributaries of the Aral Sea.  
 Following the implementation of the three treaties regarding the Aral Sea a 
dispute occurred in 1995. Turkmenistan President Niyazov informed his Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan counterparts, Nazarbayev and Karimov, by telephone that for objective 
reasons, he was not be able to visit Almaty for the session of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) heads of state (International Water Event Database).  The CIS 
session would be attended by all heads of state of Central Asia and representatives of the 
Russian Federation to discuss a variety of transboundary issues, including the Aral Sea. 
However, with the absence of Turkmenistan President Niyazov, it will be difficult to 
make decisions about the management of the Aral Sea. 
In 1996, an Agreement between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on Water 
Management was implemented. This treaty focuses on all transboundary waterbodies 
between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Agreement between Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan on Water Management 1996). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan agree to 
prevent flooding and channel deformation, allocate part of their water resources to the 
Aral Sea, and implement measures on land reclamation.  
In 1996 and 1998 international water treaties were implemented between 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on the management of water resources 
including use and energy resources; however, these treaties are only available in Russian 
resulting in a detailed analysis not feasible. Also implemented in 1998 was the 
59 
 
 
 
Agreement between the governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyzstan 
Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on Joint and Complex Water Use and Energy 
Resources of the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade Reservoirs. This Agreement focuses on the 
irrigation schedule for all waters in the region, including those flowing into the Aral Sea. 
Energy allocations are given for the countries involved. Once again this treaty was only 
found in Russian.  
Early in 1997, Uzbekistan threatened to cut the flow to Kazakhstan from the Aral 
Sea (Pacific Institute). In July 1997, Uzbekistan cut off 70 percent of flow downstream, 
threatening 100,000 hectares of farmland. Additionally, a Kazakhstan farmer rioted due 
to the decrease in available water diverted from the Aral Sea (International Water Event 
Database). Even though this reported transboundary conflict was focused on rivers in the 
region, the Aral Sea was impacted as a result of water cutoffs.  
Another Agreement was signed in 1998, the Agreement between the government 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the 
government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Cooperation in the Area of Environment 
and Rational Nature Use. This agreement seeks to realistically estimate “potentialities of 
ecological dangers in the context of unfavorable natural climatic and 
hydrometeorological conditions” while also recognizing the essential need for protection 
and improvement of the Aral Sea degradation (Cooperation in the Area of Environment 
and Rational Nature Use 1998. Furthermore, the Agreement encourages Parties to 
develop cooperation regarding environmental protection and rational use of natural 
resources, focused on the Aral Sea. In order to achieve cooperation between riparian 
countries, the Agreement facilitates the development and implementation of joint 
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purpose-oriented programs and projects on environmental protection, soil conservation, 
pollution control as well as developing new environmental resource technologies which 
protect against degradation. Parties agree to perform joint research and exchange 
information, technologies, and specialists.   
The Tashkent Declaration was signed in 1998 governing the Aral Sea. As stated 
above, the agreement focuses on economic development of the Central Asian States 
creating SPECA, intended to support cooperation between countries and provide 
incentives for economic development. The final international water treaty implemented in 
1998 regarding the Aral Sea is the CIS Agreement on Rational Management and 
Protection of Transboundary Waterbodies. This Agreement focuses on the preventing of 
freshwater pollution, increasing purification for sewage, distributing adequate water 
supplies, and establishing a common water monitoring system. Furthermore, this 
Agreement between the riparian countries of the Aral Sea and other countries, agree to 
exchange information regarding water quality and water quantity of shared waterbodies 
including the Aral Sea.  
The implementation of treaties continued in 1999, with three treaties were 
implemented governing the Aral Sea. First, the Agreement on the Status of the 
International Aral Sea Fund and its organizations was signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Taijkistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This Agreement established a variety of 
committees including Executive Committee, Interstate Coordination Water-economic 
Commission, and the Commission on Sustainable Development.  
Additionally in 1999, the Protocol on Interesting Amendments and Addenda in 
the Agreement between the governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
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Republic, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the use of water and energy resources of the 
Syr Darya Basin was signed. The Protocol’s goal is to establish an increase in 
cooperation regarding water and energy resources. Equal amounts of electric power 
generated on transboundary waterbodies shall be given to each country. The final 
international water treaty implemented in 1999, governing the Aral Sea is the Agreement 
between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the Sphere of 
Hydrometeorology.  
The Multilateral Agreement between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan regarding the establishment of the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation 
was signed in 2002. The Parties agree to carry out coordinated and concerted actions in 
the sphere of rational and mutually advantageous management of waterbodies. The text 
of the treaty is in Russian resulting further analysis to be lacking. 
Despite the numerous international water treaties implemented between 1998 
and 2002, an international water conflict occurred in 2008 and 2009. In 2008, Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan raised concerns regarding the water use of the other country leading to a 
water-energy consortium between the two countries (OOSKAnews 2008). International 
water treaties implemented in 1998 and 1999 addressed use and allocation of water and 
energy between the riparian countries of the Aral Sea; however, these treaties appear they 
have not been completely successful in limiting international water conflict between 
riparian countries since concerns were raised regarding water and energy consortium.  
In 2009, the continued decrease in water levels in the Aral Sea has led to an 
increase in tensions between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (OOSKAnews 2009a). It is no 
surprise a high number of international water treaties and international water conflict 
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since the Aral Sea is one of the best examples of poor natural resource management, 
where extreme loss of water has occurred from poor policies and agriculture needs.  The 
international water treaties implemented regarding the Aral Sea have addressed pressing 
concerns including the inflow into the Aral Sea, water and energy allocation, and overall 
sustainable management. These focuses have potentially lead to a relatively small number 
of transboundary water conflicts occurring between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
9.8 Lake Titicaca 
Lake Titicaca experienced no reported international water conflict between the 
riparian countries of Bolivia and Peru from 1990 to 2013. Only one international water 
treaty specific to Lake Titicaca implemented between 1990 and 2013. In 1993, Notes 
Reversals related to the Creation of the Autonomous Binational Authority of the Basins 
of Lake Titicaca, Desaquedera River, Lake Poopo, and Coispsasa Salt Pant System was 
signed by Bolivia and Peru (International Water Treaty Database). The treaty sets out to 
detail the responsibilities of the Binational Authority which oversees the development in 
the basin of the Titicaca-Poopo system. Some of these responsibilities include 
maintaining and developing the technical instrument and promoting, managing, and 
providing over-site on national and bi-national projects (Notas Reversals related to the 
Creation of the Autonomous Binational Authority 1993). Furthermore, the treaty has an 
element of conflict resolution and promotes joint management of Lake Titicaca between 
Bolivia and Peru (Notas Reversals related to the Creation of the Autonomous Binational 
Authority 1993).  
The international water treaty of 1993 may be the main reason for no reported 
international water conflict since 1990 regarding Lake Titicaca, but there may be other 
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factors which play a more significant role such as governmental stability or location of 
the lake. 
9.9 Lake Turkana 
The African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources is 
the only international water treaty, besides the three general international water treaties, 
implemented between 1990 and 2013 governing Lake Turkana.  
Lake Turkana had one reported international water conflict 1990 and 2013 which 
occurred in 2012. A Kenyan environmental group, Friends of Lake Turkana, asked China 
not to provide the promised $500 million USD load to Ethiopia for Gibe III Hydroelectric 
dam (Ooskanews 2012a). The dam is under construction on the Omo River, which flows 
into Lake Turkana. It cannot be concluded that the controversial construction of this dam 
stems from the lack of treaty regarding Lake Turkana since the actual construction is on 
the Omo River, but Lake Turkana is impacted. Furthermore, the African Convention of 
the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources does not address specific hydropower 
construction projects on rivers in Africa.  
9.10 Lake Albert and Lake Edward 
Lake Albert and Lake Edward are located between Uganda and the DR of 
Congo. These two lakes have no treaties specific to the lake implemented between 1990 
and 2013. The African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
in 2003 governs both of these lakes as well as the three general transboundary water 
treaties.  
It is hypothesized, since there are no international water conflicts between 
Uganda and the DR of Congo, international water treaties specific to the lake have not 
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been developed. There is no sense of urgency between these Uganda and the DR of 
Congo to develop a legally binding treaty since there does not appear to be any conflicts.  
9.11 Lake Nasser 
 More international water conflicts occurred between Egypt and Sudan than the 
implementation of international water treaties between 1990 and 2013. In 1992, a border 
dispute occurred between Egypt and Sudan in the Hala’ib triangle (International Water 
Event Database). Sudan has stated it plans to build water projects both in the Nile River 
and Lake Nasser, west of the Hala’ib triangle. In 1995, another conflict occurred 
regarding the Hala’ib triangle. Sudan Interior Minister Brigadier General Khayr stated 
that any attack by Egyptian forces on the Sudanese police force in the Hala’ib triangle 
will be considered a clear violation of border agreements. Furthermore, if an attack takes 
place, Sudan has stated it will be free of its obligations to other agreements, including 
those regarding transboundary water bodies. Also in 1995, Sudan Secretary General of 
the National Islamic Front, Al-Turabi, threatened that Sudan would use water, potentially 
from Lake Nasser, as a weapon in its ongoing dispute with Egypt (International Water 
Event Database). While Lake Nasser could be used as a weapon in the conflict between 
Sudan and Egypt, the conflict regarding the Hala’ib triangle stem from more than 
concerns with Lake Nasser. This territory has been disputed for a number of years on 
who the legitimate owner is (International Water Event Database).  
The African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
was implemented in 2003 and is the governing treaty of Lake Nasser between 1990 and 
2013. As stated above, the goals of the Convention are to enhance environmental 
protection, foster the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, and to 
65 
 
 
 
harmonize and coordinate policies in natural resources, including water (African 
Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 2003).  
Even after the 2003 African Convention of the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources, a conflict occurred in 2007 between Sudan and Egypt. Experts in 
Sudan and Egypt have raised concerns about the lack of a clear-cut plan to handle the 
extensive amount of Nile River water accumulating in Lake Nasser behind the Aswan 
High Dam (OOSKAnews 2007a). There have been no implemented international water 
treaties relating to the water accumulation behind the Aswan High Dam. The lack of 
international water treaties governing Lake Turkana, specifically hydropower, has led to 
conflicts between Sudan and Egypt. Additionally, the disputed Hala’ib triangle between 
Egypt and Sudan has led to an increase in water from Lake Nasser to be used as a 
weapon. The conflict between Egypt and Sudan around the Hala’ib triangle needs to be 
addressed to decrease the likelihood of impacts to Lake Nasser. 
9.12 Lake Kariba and Lake Cahora Bassa 
In 2003, the Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse 
Commission was signed by riparian countries of Lake Kariba and Lake Cahora Bassa; 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. The agreement encompasses the entire Zambezi 
watershed including Lake Kariba and Lake Cahora Bassa (Agreement on the 
Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission 2003). The Zambezi 
Commission was created from the Agreement and is an international organization that 
collects, evaluates, and disseminates all data and information on the Zambezi watercourse 
(Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission 2003). 
ZAMCOM, as the Zambezi Watercourse Commission is known was also created to 
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advise Member States on measures necessary for dispute avoidance including in assisting 
in conflict resolution (Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse 
Commission 2003). Furthermore, ZAMCOM promotes, supports, coordinates, and 
harmonizes the management and development of water resources within the Zambezi 
Watercourse, including Lake Kariba and Lake Cahora Bassa. Overall, ZAMCOM’s goal 
is to assist the Member States in achieving regional cooperation and integration through 
sharing the Zambezi Watercourse. The Member States, including Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
and Mozambique, commit to “sustainable development, sustainable utilization, 
prevention of harm, precaution, inter-generational equality, cooperation, equitable and 
reasonable utilization (Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi Watercourse 
Commission 2003).  
There are four general African treaties governing Lake Kariba and Lake Cahora 
Bassa: two protocols on shared watercourses in the Southern African Development 
Community in 1995, The Revised Protocol on Shared Water Courses in the Southern 
African Development Community in 2000, and The African Convention of the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in 2003.   
Since the implementation of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambezi 
Watercourse Commission treaty there is no experienced conflict between 1990 and 2013. 
While ZAMCOM was an important component of the Agreement, there is not 
enforcement mechanisms outlined in the treaty. Nonetheless, Lake Kariba and Lake 
Cahora Bassa have not had any reported international water conflict between 1990 and 
2013; therefore, international water conflict between the riparian countries of Lake 
Cahora Bassa and Lake Kiriba was the not the driver of the implementation of the 
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international water treaty. The Agreement may be one reason there is still an absence in 
conflict between riparian countries, Zambezi, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique after 
implementation.  
9.13 Lake Mweru 
A conflict occurred in 1998 at the end of a meeting of Zambia-Congo Joint 
Permanent Commission (International Water Event Database). Observations were made 
that there were no shared water agreements regarding Lake Mweru as well as Lake 
Tanganyika. Concerns were raised by members of the Zambia-Congo Joint Permanent 
Commission. Unlike the riparian countries of Lake Tanganyika implementing the 
Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika in 2003, there has not 
been an international water treaty implemented regarding Lake Mweru concerns were 
raised about the lack of a shared water agreement. Despite the lack of treaty, no 
international water conflicts have occurred between Zambia and the DR of Congo 
regarding the management and sustainability of Lake Mweru. 
9.14 Lake Xingkai 
In 1997, the Agreement between the Government of the Russia Federation and 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on Guiding Principles of the Joint 
Economic Activity was signed by Russia and China. The primary focus of this agreement 
is economic development resulting in Russia and China agreeing on joint economic 
activity along the border. Overall, the agreement calls for coordination between both 
Parties relating to economic development within transboundary water regions. Even 
though the treaty focuses on economic cooperation in transboundary waters, the treaty 
does not specifically mention water quality, water quantity, monitoring, enforcement, or 
conflict resolution.  Furthermore, there is no establishment of an institutional mechanism.  
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In 2008, the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and 
the Government of People’s Republic of China on Rational Management and Protection 
of Transboundary Waters was signed. Overall, Russia and China agree to prevent any 
negative transboundary effects due to the discharge of pollutants. This treaty specifically 
focuses on transboundary rivers, lakes, streams, and wetlands located. Furthermore, the 
Agreement established a joint commission where Russia and China agreed to exchange 
information and promote scientific research specifically related to transboundary water 
management (Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of People’s Republic of China 2008).  
The two international water treaties appear to be effective in governing Lake 
Xingkai since no international water conflicts were reported between Russia and China 
regarding Lake Xingkai between 1990 and 2013. 
9.15 Lake Merin 
Lake Merin had no reported international water conflicts occur between its 
riparian countries, Uruguay and Brazil between 1990 and 2013. In 1991, the 
Complementary Agreement to the Basic Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreement 
between the Government of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Federal Republic of 
Brazil on the Cooperation in the Area of Water Resources was signed. Uruguay and 
Brazil agreed to create mechanisms to facilitate joint development of mutual interests 
(International Water Treaties Database). While this treaty has no enforcement, no 
monitoring, and no conflict resolution it seems to have prevented water related conflict 
occurring between Uruguay and Brazil over Lake Merin since there have been no 
reported international water conflicts. 
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9.16 Lake Sargamysh 
In 1996, an Agreement between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on Water 
Management was implemented, focused on all transboundary waterbodies between 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Agreement between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on 
Water Management 1996). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the riparian countries of Lake 
Sargamysh, agree to prevent flooding, prevent channel deformation, allocate part of their 
water resources to the Aral Sea, and implement measures on land reclamation.  
In 1998, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by Central Asian States, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (International Water Treaties 
Database).  This international treaty focuses on the economic development of the Central 
Asian States governing Lake Sargamysh, the Aral Sea, and the Caspian Sea. SPECA was 
adopted with the intention to support the countries developing their cooperation and 
provide incentives for economic development (UNECE 2014). While Turkmenistan is 
not a Party of this treaty, it is still governs Lake Sargamysh because it provides support 
for Uzbekistan to develop cooperation efforts between bordering countries. In 1998, the 
CIS Agreement on Rational Management and Protection of Transboundary Waterbodies 
was signed governing Lake Sargamysh. The signatures of the treaty included Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, who agree to cooperate to prevent freshwater pollution, exchange 
information, increase water quality by increase water purification, and establish basic 
principles for water management (CIS Agreement on Rational Management and 
Protection of Transboundary Waterbodies 1998).  
No international water conflicts was reported between 1990 and 2013 regarding 
Lake Sargamysh. One reason for the lack of conflict may be the focus in the region being 
on the Aral Sea. As previously stated, the Aral Sea is an extreme example of 
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environmental degradation caused by humans; therefore, the attention in the region has 
potentially been on the Aral Sea for the last decades, shifting focus away from Lake 
Sargamysh. There is still the potential for the treaty implemented regarding Lake 
Sargamysh between 1990 and 2013 to be the main mechanism for no international water 
conflict.  
9.17 Lake Uvs 
Between 1990 and 2013, there are no international water treaties implemented 
specifically regarding Lake Uvs.  Furthermore, there are no international water conflicts 
over Lake Uvs between 1990 and 2013 between Russia and Mongolia.  
9.18 Lake Peipsi 
Between 1990 and 2013 there were no international water treaties implemented 
specifically regarding Lake Peipsi. Additionally, there were no international water 
conflicts over Lake Peipsi between 1990 and 2013 between Estonia and Russia.  
9.19 Lake of the Woods 
An Act to amend the International Boundary Waters Treaty was signed by the 
United States and Canada in 2002. The International Boundary Waters Treaty was 
originally signed on January 11, 1909 to address all transboundary waterbodies between 
the United States and Canada. The International Boundary Waters Treaty Act was created 
to increase implementation of the Treaty as well as increase clarification of Treaty 
elements (International Boundary Waters Treaty Act 2002). The Act prohibits bulk 
removed of boundary waters from the basin which they are located in, requires obtaining 
licenses for water-related projects that will affect water quantity, and provides clear 
sanctions and penalties for violation (International Boundary Waters Treaty Act 2002).  
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Following the implementation of the Act in 2002, tensions rose between the 
United States and Canada regarding Lake of the Woods. Two incidents in 2005 focused 
on the transfer of water from Lake of the Woods to Fargo, North Dakota raised concerns 
in Canada (International Water Event Database). Fargo had a plan to construct a pipeline 
originating at Lake of the Woods. This pipeline was to be used in the event of a drought, 
which is predicted to occur within the next 25 years (International Water Event 
Database). Furthermore, Fargo claimed their population would double to more than 
200,000 by 2050 as well as being a center for water-intensive food processing industries 
(Fallding and Rabson 2005). The pipeline from Lake of the Woods to Fargo has not been 
constructed, partly due from the recommendation of IJC.  
Since no transport of water out of the Lake of the Woods basin occurred, it 
appears the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act in 2002 along with the original 
International Boundary Waters Treaty has been successful in preventing bulk water 
transfer. However, the Act did not eliminate concerns beings raised and tensions high 
between United States and Canada regarding Lake of the Woods. 
9.20 Lake Kivu 
There was only one international water treaty implemented between 1990 and 
2013 which governs Lake Kivu. The African Convention of the Conservation of Nature 
and Natural Resources was implemented in 2003. There were no reported international 
water conflicts between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo regarding Lake 
Kivu between 1990 and 2013.    
9.21 Lake Itaipu 
International water conflicts occurred between Brazil and Paraguay regarding 
Lake Itaipu in 1991 and 1993. Both of these conflicts focused on the hydroelectric dam, 
72 
 
 
 
Itaipu Dam. In 1991, the Brazil Integration Ministry said Brazil’s opposed the Itaipu 
Hydroelectric Dam program for integrated electricity use (International Water Event 
Database). The hydroelectricity produced from the dam is used by Brazil and Paraguay 
based on a treaty signed by Brazil and Paraguay in 1973. While energy is being wasted in 
Brazil and Paraguay from an excess, Argentina and Uruguay are experiencing an energy 
shortage; but due to the treaty Argentina and Uruguay do not able to received 
hydroelectricity from the Itaipu dam. Differences in opinions between Paraguay and 
Brazil on the proper distribution of hydroelectricity from Itaipu Dam was the driver of 
this international water conflicts.   
The River Transport Agreement of the Waterway Paraguay – Parana was signed 
into place in 1992. Lake Itaipu is located within the defined Paraguay – Parana waterway, 
comprised of over 3,000 kilometers of riverways. This treaty focuses on navigation and 
trade including promoting the development, modernization, and efficiency of navigation. 
The Agreement created the Intergovernmental Committee to promote the rational use of 
waterbodies for navigation. This treaty did not address the hydropower focus of the prior 
conflict in 1991.  
Another international water conflict between Brazil and Paraguay occurred in 
1993 again focused on hydropower. Paraguay Foreign Minister, Dr. Yaeshken brought up 
the possibility of renegotiating the Itaipu Treaty, which would include Paraguay 
relinquishing its bilateral agreement with Brazil on the Itaipu Dam (International Water 
Treaty Database). Paraguay would surrender its “unfair” compensation for surrendering 
energy, which may cause a negative impact on Brazil and surrounding countries 
(International Water Event Database).  
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Along with the conflicts in 1991 and 1993 on hydropower, two international 
water conflicts occurred in 2012 focused the sale of hydroelectric power from the Itaipu 
dam (OOSKAnews 2012j). First, tensions increased between Brazil and Paraguay over 
the negotiation of hydropower produced from the Itaipu Dam. Second, in 2012 Paraguay 
stopped distributing energy supplies to neighboring countries which raised concerns from 
the neighboring countries. Paraguay stated, “We are no longer going to hand over our 
energy” (OOSKAnews 2012i). The four conflicts which occurred regarding Lake Itaipu 
focused on hydroelectricity from the Itaipu Dam. There were no international water 
treaties implemented between Brazil and Paraguay regarding the distribution of 
hydroelectricity produced from the Itaipu Dam.  
9.22 Lake Buenos Aires and Lake O’Higgins 
In 1991, the Treaty on the Environment between the Republic of Chile and the 
Republic of Argentina was signed. Argentina and Chile agreed to coordinate on the 
protection and rational utilization of water resources. Detailed information from this 
treaty was not able to be obtained due to language limitations – the treaty was in Spanish. 
However, due to the generalness of this treat it main contribute to the lack of reported 
international water conflicts between Chile and Argentina regarding Lake Buenos Aires 
and Lake O’Higgins.  There were no reported international water conflicts between Chile 
and Argentina regarding Lake Buenos Aires or Lake O’Higgins between 1990 and 2013.  
9.23 Lake Chad 
Two treaties were implemented between 1990 and 2013 regarding Lake Chad. In 
1990, the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Republic of Niger 
Concerning the Equitable Sharing in the Development, Conservation, and Use of their 
Common Resources was implemented. The goal of the Agreement is to foster sustained 
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cooperation in the development, conservation, and use of the shared resources. Niger and 
Nigeria will collect, process, and provide data and information to the Nigeria-Niger Joint 
Commission for cooperation needed to arrive at equitable sharing determinations for 
Lake Chad. Furthermore, the Agreement creates a Permanent Technical Committee of 
Water Experts composed of an equal number of representatives from Niger and Nigeria. 
This Committee of Water Experts is required to meet every four years and when needed.  
According to the Agreement, if a dispute occurs it will be referred to the Nigeria-Niger 
Joint Commission for Cooperation (Agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
and the Republic of Niger Concerning the Equitable Sharing in the Development, 
Conservation, and Use of their Common Resources 1990). If a dispute is not resolved 
within six months, it will then be referred to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, 
and Arbitration of the Organization of African Unity for resolution. The African 
Convention of the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources was also implemented 
in 2003 governing Lake Chad. 
There were no reported international water conflicts between 1990 and 2013 
regarding Lake Chand between Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon.   
 
9.24 Rainy Lake, Lake Champlain, and Lake St. Clair 
In 2000, the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act was signed by the United 
States and Canada.  The Act prohibits bulk removed of boundary waters from their 
original basin, requires obtaining licenses for impactful water-related projects, and 
provides clear sanctions and penalties for violation (International Boundary Waters 
Treaty Act 2002). The Boundary Treaty Waters Act governs Rainy Lake, Lake 
Champlain, and Lake St. Clair as well as the Laurentian Great Lakes. 
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There were no reported international water conflicts that occurred between the 
United States and Canada regarding Rainy Lake, Lake Champlain, and Lake St. Clair 
between 1990 and 2013.  
9.25 Lago de Yacyreta  
International water treaties were implemented during the 1990s while 
international water conflict between the riparian countries of Lago de Yacyreta occurred 
in 2012 and 2013. The first international water treaty was implemented in 1992; the River 
Transport Agreement for the Waterway Paraguay – Parana was signed in 1992. Along 
with Lake Itaipu, Lago de Yacyreta is in the defined watershed. The Agreement focuses 
on navigation and trade including promoting the development, modernization, and 
efficiency of navigation.  
The Agreement Constituting the Trilateral Commission for the Development of 
the Pilcomayo River Basin was signed by Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia in 1995. 
Through this Agreement the Trilateral Commission was established with the 
responsibility to study and execute joint projects between the riparian countries. 
Additionally, the Trilateral Commission promotes the rational exploration of natural 
resources, including the rational exploration of hydroelectric energy.  Furthermore, the 
Trilateral Commission regulates the discharge of any hazardous material into the brains, 
including Lago de Yacyreta (Agreement Constituting the Trilateral Commission for the 
Development of the Pilcomayo River Basin 1995).  
The Agreement on Conservation and Development of the Fishery Resources in 
the Border Stretches of the Parana and Paraguay Rivers authorizes Argentina and 
Paraguay was implemented in 1996. Furthermore, the Agreement defines fishing rights in 
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border regions and promotes the implementation of an action plan for the conservation of 
fishing, including the migration patterns of fishes.  Between 1990 and 2013 there have 
been no reported international water conflict between Argentina and Paraguay with a 
focus of fishing.  
Finally, in 2000 the Agreement of the Exchange of Notes on Created a Security 
Zone thousand meters Downstream and Upstream for the Entirety of the Yacyreta 
Hydroelectric Dam was implemented by Paraguay and Argentina. The majority of the 
treaties regarding Lago de Yacyreta are written in Spanish and English translations were 
not located; therefore, it is difficult determine if the components contained in the treaty 
are effective at preventing international water conflict.  
Despite treaties on navigation, fishing, and hydropower two international water 
conflicts occurred between 1990 and 2013 regarding Lago de Yacyreta. The two conflicts 
were focused on hydropower occurring after the implementation of all international water 
treaties for the defined time frame. In 2012, Paraguay stopped supplying hydropower to 
the neighboring countries were sparked a variety of verbal concerns by Argentina and 
other neighboring countries (OOSKAnews 2012j). Additionally, in 2013 Paraguayans 
and Argentinians protested the Yacyreta Hydroelectric Dam by blocking the access to the 
dam (OOSKAnews 2013i). As stated above a treaty between Argentina and Paraguay 
was signed in 2000 regarding hydroelectricity; however, it appears this treaty has not 
been completely effective in the preventing conflict between Argentina and Paraguay 
focused on hydropower. There were no reported international water conflicts with the 
primary or secondary focus of fisheries, navigation, or water quality between 1990 and 
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2013. The lack of conflict on these topics may be due to the implementation of treaties 
regarding fisheries, navigation, and water quality.  
9.26 Lake Chilwa 
Four African treaties described earlier govern Lake Chilwa between 1990 and 
2013. The Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the SADC region in May 1995, the 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the SADC region in August 1995, the Revised 
Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the SADC Region in 2000, and the African 
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources govern Lake Chilwa.  
Even with the implementation of four treaties focused on transboundary waters, 
there was one reported international water conflict in 2012 regarding Lake Chilwa. 
Citizens of Malawi and Mozambique expressed concerns about Lake Chilwa becoming a 
dry lakebed from environmental degradation and climate change (OOSKAnews 2012f). 
The four general African treaties are intended to promote sustainability and conservation 
while also decreasing environmental degradation.  Due to the fact the riparian countries 
have not implemented an international water treaty specific to Lake Chilwa between 1990 
and 2013, citizens are concerned with the sustainable future of this essential resource.  
9.27 Szczecin Lagoon 
Three international water treaties were implemented and there was one reported 
international water conflict between the riparian countries of Szczecin Lagoon between 
1990 and 2013.  International water treaties between Poland and Germany were 
implemented in 1992, 1996, and 1997 regarding Szczecin Lagoon. The Agreement 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on Cooperation in 
the Field of Water Management at Border Waters was implemented in 1992. This 
Agreement focused on the joint management between Poland and Germany regarding 
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transboundary waterbodies, including Szczecin Lagoon. Through the Agreement, a 
permanent Commission on Boundary Waters was created, focused on the protection of 
surface water and groundwater quality and quantity (1992).  
In 1996, the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany, the Czech 
Republic and the Republic of Poland on the Protection of the Oder River from Pollution 
was implemented. While this agreement has a main focus on the Oder River, the scope 
includes the protection of drainage areas, including Szczecin Lagoon, since the Oder 
River empties into the Szczecin Lagoon. Parties of the agreement created a commission 
to determine water quality measurements. The overall goal of the agreement is to prevent 
pollution into the Oder River and drainage area. Germany, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic are required to exchange information regarding the protection of the Oder River 
and Szczecin Lagoon, including protection of drinking water.  
 In 1997, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context was implemented. Originally signed in 1991, various European 
countries are governed by this treaty, including Poland and Germany. The goal of the 
Convention is to “ensure environmentally sound and sustainable development” in 
transboundary areas (Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context 1997).  All Parties will, individually or jointly, take all 
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce, and control significant adverse transboundary 
impacts. The Convention does not prevent Parties from entering bilateral or multilateral 
treaties regarding transboundary issues. Furthermore, Parties will exchange information 
as well as analyzing and monitoring the efficient implementation of proposed activities. 
Appendix I of the Convention includes a list of 17 potential actions (crude oil refineries, 
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thermal power stations, waste disposal, large dam construction, major mining, and 
deforestation) which require an environmental impact statement, notification to parties of 
potential adverse impacts, and exchange of information (Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1997). Furthermore, the Convention of 
1997 states that if a dispute occurs between Parties about the interpretation or application 
of the Convention a solution should be reached by negotiation or by another method of 
dispute settlement (Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context 1997). If the dispute is not resolved to the satisfaction of the Parties through 
negotiation, Parties may submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. 
Despite three specific treaties to Szczecin Lagoon in the 1900s, an international 
water conflict occurred in 2005 regarding the high levels of pollution the in Oder River 
and Szczecin Lagoon. Greenpeace activists from Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Austria, and Germany protested against the high levels of pollution in the Szczecin 
Lagoon and Oder River. The protests were staged at Brzeg Dolny near Wroclaw, Poland, 
where a chemical plant discharges its waste directly into the Oder River causing 
significant degradation of the Szczecin Lagoon (International Water Event Database). 
Recall, in 1996 a treaty was implemented for the protection against pollution to the Oder 
River and Szczecin. Since concerns were raised in 2005 about the level of pollution in 
these waterbodies, it does not appear the Treaty of 1996 has been successful in 
preventing concerns about water quality.  
9.28 Lake Zun-Torey 
Lake Zun-Torey had one international water treaty implemented between 1990 
and 2013 and no reported international water conflict.  The Agreement between the 
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Government of Mongolia and the Government of the Russia Federation on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Waters was signed in 1995. This Agreement defines 
transboundary waters as rivers, watercourses, lakes and other surface waters and 
groundwater intersected by the State frontier.  The goal of the Agreement is to develop 
“good-neighborly relations and cooperation in the protection and rational utilization of 
transboundary waters”. Additionally, the treaty promotes the rational management and 
protection of transboundary water resources against pollution and building joint water 
monitoring programs. The Treaty incorporates information exchange and heavily 
promotes cooperation between riparian countries over transboundary waterbodies, which 
may be the reason for the lack of reported conflict between 1990 and 2013. 
10.0 Results  
10.1 Key Findings  
Between 1990 and 2013, 52 international water treaties governing large 
transboundary lakes were implemented. Joint management was the main primary focus of 
the international water treaties, 24 of 52. Asia had 19 international water treaties 
implemented between 1990 and 2013, making it the continent with the most international 
water treaties implemented. Only four percent of the 52 treaties governing large 
transboundary lakes included a mechanism of enforcement. Additionally, international 
water treaties lack information exchanging, monitoring, and conflict resolution 
mechanisms.  
Between 1990 and 2013, 53 international water conflicts were reported regarding 
the 35 largest transboundary lakes.  Most of these conflicts focused on water quantity and 
border delineation. There were no reported violent conflicts, instead the majority of 
reported conflicts were verbal threats and legal action between riparian countries. More 
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than half of the large transboundary lakes, 18 of the 35, experienced no reported 
transboundary conflict between 1990 and 2013. Of the 17 large transboundary lakes 
reporting conflict, six experienced no related conflicts to the implemented treaties.   
The majority of the reported water conflicts, 28 of the 53, were not related to 
content of a treaty implemented prior to the occurrence of conflict. Africa had the most 
international water conflict between 1990 and 2013 with 30 reported transboundary water 
conflicts. Lake Malawi had the most reported transboundary conflict with 15 conflicts 
between Malawi and Tanzania.  
10.2 Primary Focus and Secondary Focus 
The primary and secondary focuses are vital to understand the relationship 
between the contents of the treaty and of the conflict. It is important to note that not all 
international water treaties and conflicts had a secondary focus; some conflicts were 
specifically about water quantity, while others had elements of irrigation and water 
quantity. For example, in 1997 when Uzbekistan cut off 70 percent of flow the primary 
issues was water quantity, but the secondary issue was irrigation since 100,000 hectares 
of farmland were threatened.  
 
 
Figure 11: The primary and secondary focus of international water treaties from 1990 to 2013 governing 
large transboundary lakes.  
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The majority of international water treaties governing large transboundary lakes 
have a primary focus of joint management; 24 of the 52 treaties (46 percent) have a 
primary focus of joint management (Figure 11). Treaties with a primary focus of joint 
management were defined as “documents involving joint management of the basin or 
water resources, especially where the management concerns cover a range of issue areas” 
(International Water Event Database).  The second and third highest primary focuses of 
international water treaties governing large transboundary lakes are water quality and 
water quantity.  There are no international water treaties implemented between 1990 and 
2013 with a primary or secondary focus of border issues, territorial issues, groundwater, 
or recreation (Figure 11). 
 
Twenty of the 53 international water conflicts between 1990 and 2013 had a 
primary focus of water quantity (Figure 12). The second highest primary focus of 
international water conflicts was border issues with 14 of the 53 conflicts.  These 
Figure 12: The primary and secondary focus of international water conflicts between 1990 and 2013. 
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conflicts occurred between Tanzania and Malawi regarding the border of Lake Malawi 
between 1990 and 2013.  International water conflicts centered on water quantity were 
concentrated between the riparian countries of the Aral Sea and Lake Victoria. The 
riparian countries of Lake Victoria experienced conflict over the appropriate withdrawal 
amount by each riparian country from Lake Victoria. Irrigation was the dominant 
secondary focus for international water conflicts.  
10.3 International Water Treaty and International Water Conflict  
 
Between 1990 and 2013 there were 52 international water treaties implemented. 
There were more international water treaties implemented regarding large transboundary 
lakes during the 1990s than during the 2000s (Figure 13). A total of 13 treaties were 
implemented during the 2000s, while 39 treaties were implemented during the 1990s. The 
two years that experienced the greatest number of international treaty implementation are 
1992 and 1999 with six treaties.  
Figure 13: The number of international water conflicts that occurred and international water treaties 
implemented between 1990 and 2013 for large transboundary lakes. 
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Between 1990 and 2013 there were 53 reported international water conflicts. The 
number of international water conflicts is greater in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s 
(Figure 13). There were 13 reported conflicts regarding large transboundary lakes in the 
1990s, while there were 40 reported international water conflicts in the 2000s.  
Annually, more international water treaties were implemented than reported 
international water conflict between 1990 and 2003, except in 1991 and 2001. In 1991, 
there were two international water treaties implemented and two reported international 
water conflict, and one conflict reported in 2001. After 2003, the number of annual 
reported international water conflict is greater than the number of international water 
treaties, except in 2006 and 2010.  In 2006, there were no reported treaties or conflicts, 
and in 2010 where there were two reported conflicts and two treaties implemented. There 
was not an observed decrease in international water conflict in the 2000s after the 39 
international water treaties were implemented in the 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between 1990 and 2013, the Aral Sea experienced the highest number of 
international water treaties implemented with 17 (Figure 14). The Caspian Sea and Lake 
Figure 14: The number of international water treaties and international water conflict from the lake with the 
highest number of treaties to the lowest. 
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Victoria each had 11 treaties implemented between 1990 and 2013 (Figure 14). Two 
lakes, Lake Uvs between Mongolia and Russia, and Lake Peipsi between Russia and 
Estonia, had no international water treaties implemented between 1990 and 2013 
specifically regarding the lake. These lakes are governed by three international water 
treaties which govern all large transboundary lakes. One international water treaty in 
1992 and two in 1999 were implemented which govern all transboundary waterbodies, 
including large transboundary lakes. The Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes was implemented in 1992. The 
Agreement on Transboundary Cooperation and the UN Protocol on Water and Health of 
the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes were implemented in 1999.  These treaties are not specific to one 
large transboundary lake rather they govern general transboundary waters.  
The following large transboundary lakes experienced no reported international 
water conflict between 1990 and 2013: Lake Titicaca, Lake Albert, Lake Kariba, Lake 
Cahora Bassa, Lake Xingkai, Lake Merin, Lake Sarygamysh, Lake Uvs, Lake Peipsi, 
Lake Kivu, Lake Edward, Lake Buenos Aires, Lake Chad, Lake St. Clair, Lake 
Champlain, Lake O’Higgins, and Rainy Lake (Figure 14). Lake Malawi had the most 
reported international water conflict between 1990 and 2013, having 15 international 
water conflicts reported in 2012 and 2013.  Lake Victoria had seven international water 
conflicts between 1990 and 2013, focused on water quality and water quantity.  
Lakes displaying a relatively high number of international water treaties do not 
indicate a low number of reported international water conflict between riparian countries. 
For example, 11 international water treaties were implemented between 1990 and 2013 
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governing Lake Victoria, but Lake Victoria still experienced seven international water 
conflicts. On the other hand, Lago de Yacyreta had eight international water treaties 
implemented between 1990 and 2013, and Lago de Yactreta only experienced two 
international water conflicts. Only two large transboundary lakes experienced more 
international water conflict between 1990 and 2013 than implementation of international 
water treaties: Lake Malawi and Lake Nasser. 
As shown with examples above, there is no apparent pattern between the number 
of international treaties and the number of international water conflicts that occur 
between 1990 and 2013 on a lake basis. While the number of international water treaties 
decreases by lake, the number of international water conflicts does not increase.  There is 
potential for external variables, economic, political, and environment to impact the 
amount of international water conflict that occurs between the riparian countries of large 
transboundary lakes.  
The dominant primary focus of the international water treaties implemented 
between 1990 and 2013 was joint management; 24 of the 52 international water treaties 
had a primary focus of joint management (Figure 15). There were only two-reported 
international water conflicts with the primary focus of joint management. Water quantity 
was the focus of the majority of transboundary water conflicts (Figure 15).  Between 
1990 and 2013, 14 international water conflicts were reported between Tanzania and 
Malawi with the primary focus of border issues. There were no international water 
treaties focused on border delineation of large transboundary lakes implemented between 
1990 and 2013. Twenty international water conflicts occurred between 1990 and 2013 
focused on water quantity, while seven international water treaties were implemented. 
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Water quantity encompasses two main categories: first, is the volume of water that is 
present in the lake; and second is the amount of water each riparian country is allowed to 
use or withdraw from the lake.  
 
 
 
10.4 Regional Results 
Africa experienced the most transboundary lake conflict and Asia had the most 
international water treaties implemented between 1990 and 2013 (Figure 16). Asia 
experienced the highest number of international water treaties; 19 treaties were 
implemented in Asia between 1990 and 2013. The high number of international water 
treaties implemented in Asia was primary due to the high number of treaties implemented 
regarding the Aral Sea. Africa and the United States had more reported international 
water conflict than international water treaties implemented between 1990 and 2013. 
Africa experienced the most international water conflicts between 1990 and 2013 with 30 
reported international water conflicts. Africa has had the second most international water 
treaties implemented between 1990 and 2013 with 11. North America, United States and 
Figure 15: A comparison of primary focus of international water treaties and international water conflict 
between 1990 and 2013. 
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Canada, had three international water treaties implemented between 1990 and 2013, but 
six reported international water conflicts; these conflicts were mainly focused on the bulk 
transfer of water out of the basin of origin.   
 
10.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of International Water Treaties 
The following four components were used to evaluate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the international water treaties governing large transboundary lakes: 
information exchange, monitoring, conflict resolution, and enforcement (Wolf 1998). 
Over half, 53 percent of the large lake treaties between 1990 and 2013 include 
information exchange (Figure 17). Less than half, 46 percent of the treaties included 
monitoring. This monitoring includes extent of pollution, status construction projects, and 
allocation amounts.  
There were less international water treaties that contained an element of conflict 
resolution; only 38 percent mentioned a mechanism to resolve disputes when they arise. 
These mechanisms ranged from Partiers given the responsibility to resolve the dispute 
Figure 16: Number of international water treaties and number of international water conflicts by continent for 
large transboundary lakes between 1990 and 2013. 
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themselves to taking the dispute to international court to a third party acting as a mediator 
or negotiator. Less than four percent of the 52 international water treaties governing large 
transboundary have a mechanism of enforcement.   
 
The TFDD project complied 145 international water treaties from 1870 until 
2000. While there is treaty overlap between the TFDD and this study, new information is 
presented in this study including incorporating data focused on transboundary lakes and 
data collected until 2013.  The observed pattern of the strengths and weaknesses 
indicators with is similar between this study and the TFDD project. Over half, 54 percent, 
of the treaties contained a mechanism of monitoring, while 54 percent of the treaties did 
not include an element of conflict resolution (Wolf 1998). While 116 of the 145 treaties 
contained no enforcement mechanism, over half of the treaties had an element of 
information exchange (Wolf 1998). The percentages of the 145 treaties compiled by 
Figure 17: Various strengths and weaknesses of international water treaties implemented between 
1990 and 2013 regarding the 35 largest transboundary lakes. 
90 
 
 
 
TFDD containing the various indicators are comparable with this study focused on large 
transboundary lakes.  Overall, treaties lacked information exchange, monitoring, conflict 
resolution, and enforcement in both studies.   
10.6 Conflict Categories 
The majority of the reported international water conflicts between 1990 and 2013 
regarding large transboundary lakes were not related to the content of the treaty. Almost 
53 percent of the international water conflicts fell into the third category (Figure 18). 
Over 33 percent of international water conflicts between 1990 and 2013 that were related 
to the content of an international water treaty implemented in a prior year. Only 15 
percent of the reported international water conflicts occurred before the implementation 
of a treaty.  When the international water conflicts that occurred before the 
implementation of a treaty in this study are removed, almost 61 percent of the conflicts 
are unrelated to the content of the treaty implemented in a prior year 
Figure 18: Percentage of international water conflicts that occurred before an international water 
treaty was implemented, occurred after a treaty and are related to the content of the treaty, or 
occurred after a treaty and are NOT related to the treaty. 
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After 1998, no large transboundary lakes that experienced transboundary conflict 
without the presence of an international water treaty implemented prior to the occurrence 
of the conflict in the time frame of the study. Recall that there were more international 
water treaties implemented in the 1990s than the 2000s; resulting in the majority of large 
transboundary lakes of interest being governed by an international water treaty.  
Next, conflicts which were not related to the content of the treaty implemented 
prior were removed. Of the 17 large transboundary lakes that had reported international 
water conflict, six lakes had no reported international water conflict that was related to 
the content of a treaty implemented between 1990 and 2013 (Appendix 1). This results in 
24 of the 35 large transboundary lakes having no reported conflict related to the content 
of a treaty. The following six lakes experienced conflict that was not related to the 
content of the treaty implemented prior: Lake Tanganyika, Lake Malawi, Lake Turkana, 
Lake Nasser, Lake Mweru, and Lake Itaipu. Almost 65 percent, 11 of the 17 large 
transboundary lakes with reported conflict, experienced conflict related to the content of 
a prior implemented international treaty (Appendix 1). The following 11 lakes 
experienced conflict related to a treaty implemented prior: Caspian Sea, Lake Superior, 
Lake Victoria, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, Aral Sea, Lake Ontario, Lake of the Woods, Lago 
de Yacyreta, Lake Chilwa, and Szczecin Lagoon.  
  
10.7 Logistic Regression  
A logistic regression was completed with the data collected on the presence of 
conflict, the presence of a treaty, as well as economic, political, and environmental 
variables. After data imputation was completed, there were a total of 840 observations for 
each variable, resulting in a full dataset. The likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square test is 21.43 
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meaning that the null hypothesis is rejected since the model at the 95 percent significance 
level, 21.34 is greater than 16.92, the critical value at nice degrees of freedom. 
Furthermore, the probability of obtaining the chi-square statistic given that the null 
hypothesis is true is 0.0109, resulting in the rejection of the null hypothesis, of the 
contextual variables and the presence of a water treaty having no effect on the occurrence 
of international water conflict between riparian countries of large transboundary lakes.  
The following contextual variables displayed a p-value from the two-tailed z-test 
that is less or close to 0.05: average population growth, average GINI index, average 
precipitation, and average external water dependence. However, further analysis of the 
calculated odds ratios explained how each variable assists in the prediction of the 
occurrence of an international water conflict.  
The p-value for average population growth is 0.067 resulting in the average 
population growth of all riparian countries to be almost significant at the 95 percent 
confidence interval. The odds ratio of average population growth is 1.581 meaning that 
with every one unit change in population growth the chance conflict will occur is 58.1 
percent. A one percent increase in population growth increases the chances of conflict 
occurring between the riparian countries of large transboundary lakes by almost 60 
percent.  
The p-value for average GINI index is 0.055 resulting in the GINI coefficient 
being a significant independent variable to predict international water conflict. The odds 
ratio for the GINI index is 0.927 meaning that with every unit increase in the GINI index 
there is a 7.3% decrease in the chance of transboundary conflict to occur.  In other words 
as the level of inequality increases in the riparian countries of a large transboundary lake 
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there is less of a chance for international water conflict to occur.  This is opposite to prior 
studies, which concluded the greater level of inequality in a country the more likely they 
are too experience conflict (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998).  One would predict as the GINI 
Index increases and the amount of inequality in a country increases the chance of conflict 
would increase.  
Average external water dependence has a p-value of 0.016 resulting in external 
water dependence being a significant predictor of conflict at the 95 percent confidence 
interval. However, the odds ratio of external water dependence is 0.999. An odds ratio of 
one means that the odds do not change of international water conflict occurring as the 
external water dependence increases (Pollock 2014).  As a riparian country’s dependence 
on other countries increases the chance of an international water conflict does not change. 
Previous studies have shown that the higher dependency a country has on external water 
resources the changes for cooperation in the form of treaties increases (Zawahri and 
Mitchell 2011). The results of this study suggest that the amount of external water 
dependence of the riparian countries of a large transboundary lake does not increase or 
decrease the chance of conflict between those riparian countries.  
While the p-value of average precipitation of 0.098 is not significant at the 95 
percent confidence interval, the odds ratio displays a similar pattern to the average 
external water dependence.  As the average precipitation increases there is no change in 
the odds of international water conflict occurring.  
At least one environmental, political, and economic variable resulted in a 
significant impact on the predication of international water conflict. Despite the presence 
of a treaty having odds ratio of 1.224 meaning that when an international water treaty is 
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present there is a 22.4 percent chance of an international water conflict occurring, the p-
value was well above 0.05 resulting in the presence of international water treaties not 
being significant. Future studies should take into account a time lag variable to further 
understand this relationship.  
12.0 Discussion  
Addressing a large gap in current research, this study explored the relationship 
between treaties and conflict focused on large transboundary lakes, by researching the 35 
largest transboundary lakes by surface area and volume. Between 1990 and 2013, 52 
international water treaties were implemented and 53 international water conflicts 
occurred between the riparian countries of the 35 largest transboundary lakes. External 
factors such as location, political regime, population, and environmental variables play a 
role in determining whether riparian countries will experience transboundary conflict 
regarding a large lake. 
A simple relationship, where conflict decreased after a treaty was implemented 
was not observed in this study. An increase in water conflicts was observed in the 2000’s. 
One reason for the observed increase in conflicts is an increase in reporting by various 
organizations.  While, OOSKAnews, one of the main data sources for conflict, is 
considered one of the most comprehensive databases of water events, it did not start 
reporting water events until 2006 (OOSKAnews 2014). The fairly recent reporting of 
OOSKAnews, may be one reason for the observed increase in international water conflict 
during the 2000s.  Furthermore, as water scarcity increases and countries further 
understand the potential consequences for mismanagement and governance, reporting 
conflicts may increase. 
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Even with the implementation of treaties, conflicts occurred. For the large 
transboundary lakes experiencing transboundary conflict after a treaty was implemented, 
there were less reported conflicts related to the content of a treaty than conflicts not 
related to the content of a treaty.  It was concluded that 28 of the 53 reported international 
water conflicts were not related to the content of the international water treaty 
implemented prior.  Since more conflicts were unrelated to the content of a treaty 
implemented prior, there is potential for the treaty to be a mechanism to prevent conflict.    
However, after an international water treaty is implemented, there may be a greater 
incentive for a riparian country to raise concerns with a legally binding document.  Prior 
to the treaty there might have been no legal standards or protocols; therefore, a riparian 
country did not have authority to initiate conflict between another riparian country. Over 
time, the behavior of country interaction may change, including their expectations of one 
another in terms of the treaty (Brochmann 2012). Riparian countries may feel empowered 
to take action regarding the governance, border, water quantity, water quality and 
borders. Treaties governing a transboundary lake may result in an increase in water 
conflict between riparian countries due to the new mechanism. 
There was a notable difference between the dominating primary focuses of the 
treaties implemented and the conflicts that occurred between 1990 and 2013. Joint 
management was the dominant primary focus of international water treaties with 24 
treaties, while there were only two reported conflicts with the primary focus of joint 
management. Water conflicts are reported primary with a focus of one issue, where 
international water treaties encompass a large number of components. Treaties that had a 
primary focused on joint management concentrated on sustainable management and 
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conservation of the national resource. Generally, water conflicts revolve around more 
discrete issues such as water allocation or water quality, instead of joint management.  
This resulted in the large differences in the number of treaties and conflicts with a 
primary focus of joint management in this study.  
Between 1990 and 2013 there were no international water treaties implemented 
with a focus on border issues, territorial issues, groundwater, or recreation. During the 
study’s time span, 14 conflicts were reported focused on the border of Lake Malawi. It is 
alarming that 14 conflicts occurred between Malawi and Tanzania focused the border of 
Lake Malawi and no international water treaties implemented.  Since the conflicts 
happened in 2012 and 2013, there is hope that an international water treaty will be 
implemented to address the conflict between these riparian countries. Understanding the 
reasons why the transboundary conflict occurred needs to be taken into consideration 
when developing an international water treaty.  
External factors need to be understood to develop a comprehensive knowledge of 
the relationship between treaties and conflict. Annual precipitation varied by lake basin 
(Aquastat). The results of previous studies on the impact of precipitation on conflict have 
varied.  For example, Zawahri and Mitchell concluded that as precipitation increases the 
amount of available water increases resulting in less conflict (2001). However, Hsiang et 
al. (2013) found that extreme rain events resulting in a higher likelihood of international 
violence. Since previous results have varied, it is not surprising that this study did not 
conclude a distinct relationship between conflict and precipitation. The geographic and 
climatic area may influence the amount of precipitation and its impact on conflict. If a 
region is prone to extreme rain events, a decrease in rain may result in an increase in 
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conflict. However, in a dry region, an increase in rain, even though it brings an increase 
in available freshwater, would lead to an increase in conflict potentially due to inadequate 
infrastructure or governance and an increase in flooding.  
Of the 35 large transboundary lakes, the Aral Sea had the most international 
water treaties implemented with 17. The Aral Sea is a prime example of the 
mismanagement of natural resources.  The Aral Sea has lost more than 75 percent of its 
surface area since the 1960s and roughly 90 percent of its volume (Micklin 2007). Water 
from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, the two main inflows to the Aral Sea were 
diverted in the early 1960s for irrigation for cotton production, which greatly reduced the 
flow into the Aral Sea (Micklin 2007). In the summer of 2014, the Eastern half of the 
southern portion of the Aral Sea completely dried up for the first time in modern time 
(NASA 2014). The extreme change in the Aral Sea over the last decades has been a 
driver for the implementation of international water treaties governing the Aral Sea to 
ensure effective water management. Furthermore, the Aral Sea receives the third least 
amount of annual precipitation in comparison to the 35 large transboundary lakes, 
potentially increases the need for treaties due to the fact there is less available freshwater. 
External factors need to be understood and evaluated to fully comprehend the impact 
treaties have on conflict. 
Overall, the 52 treaties implemented lack vital components to ensure successful 
compliance: information exchange, monitoring, conflict resolution, and enforcement 
mechanisms.  As the indicator requires more funding, time, and personal, the less likely it 
will be included in the treaty. For example, information exchange and monitoring require 
additional personal and funding, but enforcement requires more intricate steps and 
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continued work; it was observed more treaties included monitoring and information 
exchange than conflict resolution and enforcement mechanisms. To increase the 
successful compliance of a treaty there first needs to be mechanisms in place to determine 
whether countries’ actions are inline with the treaty elements. If it is determined that a 
riparian country is not in compliance with the treaty, detailed steps must be developed to 
determine appropriate actions which will be taken to ensure compliance with the treaty. 
While essential for compliance, these enforcement mechanisms encompass numerous 
steps and have the potential to take extended periods of time, more personal, and 
additional funding.  Furthermore, including enforcement in an international water treaty 
requires increased work for the composers of treaty, potentially resulting in the observed 
minimal amount of treaties with enforcement. Nonetheless, these components need to be 
included in treaties to ensure compliance and the potential for the elimination in water 
conflict between riparian countries of large transboundary lakes.  An example of a treaty 
lacking vital components is the Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria 
Basin. The Protocol includes the “polluter pays principle” where “the person that causes 
the pollution shall as far as possible bear any costs associated with it” (2003). In order for 
the riparian countries of Lake Victoria to comply with the ‘polluter pays principle’, new 
monitoring mechanisms have to be established to accurately determine which riparian 
country is discharging pollution into Lake Victoria.  Conflicts between the riparian 
countries of Lake Victoria have occurred regarding the water quality since the 
implementation of the Protocol, potentially due to the lack of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms in the Protocol. 
99 
 
 
 
Furthermore, between 1990 and 2013, no international water treaties were 
implemented regarding water allocation in Lake Victoria. During the mid to late 2000’s 
conflicts between Lake Victoria’s riparian countries focused on water quantity, 
especially, allocation of the resource. The lack of treaties focused on water quantity may 
be a reason why Lake Victoria experienced conflicts over water allocation. The Lake 
Victoria Fisheries Organization was created in 1994, which may be the driver there were 
no reported international water conflicts regarding fisheries in Lake Victoria. 
Furthermore, it is vital to understand the components of existing treaties to understand the 
components that are lacking to assist in the development of appropriate, successful, and 
accurate treaties.  
Conflict and cooperation as they relates to transboundary water do not display a 
linear relationship; instead cooperation and conflict co-exist and should not be treated 
separately in analyses (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008). While, previous studies have 
shown that the implementation of a treaty will lead to an increase in cooperation, this 
study only included conflictive events (Wolf 1997; Wolf et al. 2003). It cannot be 
concluded whether treaties lead to an increase in cooperation between riparian countries 
of large transboundary lakes. Future studies should focus on a broader range of 
cooperative events, and how treaties play a role in decreasing conflict and increasing 
cooperative events. Studies should include other cooperative events, based on the TFDD 
BAR Sacle, which may assist in understanding if international water treaties lead to an 
increase in cooperation between riparian countries. Additionally, future studies need to 
further understand how economic, political, and environmental factors play a role in 
impacting the likelihood of conflict in large transboundary lakes.  
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There have been international water conflicts between riparian countries of large 
transboundary lakes in the past 23 years. When an international water treaty has been 
implemented there is less conflicts related to the content of the treaty than not related to 
the content of the treaty. It is essential to understand that it was concluded that 
institutions, treaties, did not eliminate or decrease conflict between riparian countries of 
large transboundary lakes. There is not a simple or direct relationship between treaties 
and conflict.  
This research study opens numerous opportunities for further researched focused 
on large transboundary lakes. For example, other studies should evaluate the effect of a 
time-lag, focused on when an international water treaty is implemented and when an 
international water conflict occurs. Furthermore, understanding if there is a time-lag 
between the contextual variables and international water conflict. For example, if the 
GINI Index increases dramatically from one year to the next, will there be a greater 
chance of conflict in the year directly following or in two, three, or more years after the 
increase. Additionally, a greater focused shall be placed on determining the impact of 
population growth on international water conflict for large transboundary lakes. 
As climate change continues and population growth accelerates available 
freshwater will become more scare.  The world population growth is expected to increase 
to 7.7 billion over the next decade (WEF 2011). The population growth will be unevenly 
distributed with the greatest increase in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (DCDC 
2010).  Water quality will decrease from increased urban growth and increase in 
industrial growth. Furthermore, The United Nations projects a 50 percent increase in 
demand for food by 2030 (United Nations 2012).  Preparation by countries, states, 
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communities, and people is vital. One form of preparation is international water treaties 
focused on water quantity and water quality. It is essential to have outlined legally 
binding cooperation between countries focused on the largest freshwater reservoirs, lakes. 
The ratification of the Convention on the Non-Navigation of International Water Sources 
in August 2014, is a step in the right direction to ensure effective and comprehensive 
management of transboundary waters. Furthermore, organizations or institutions focused 
on the governance of waterbodies containing mechanisms of enforcement of rules, 
policies, and regulations are ideal. It is the specific content of the treaties, and the 
correlation of the content to the foundational causes of conflicts, that determines the 
relevance and effectiveness of the treaties.  
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Appendix A: Event Analysis Figures – All Conflict  
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Eighteen of the 35 large transboundary lakes in this study had no reported 
international water conflict between the riparian countries between 1990 and 2013 Lake 
Titicaca, Lake Albert, Lake Kariba, Lake Cahora Bassa, Lake Xingkai, Lake Merin, Lake 
Sargamysh, Lake Uvs, Lake Peipsi, Lake Kivu, Lake Edward, Lake Buenos Aires, Lake 
Chad, Lake St. Clair, Lake Champlain, Lake O’Higgins, Rainy Lake, and Lake Zun-
Torey.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure A1: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Titicaca. 
Appendix Figure A2: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Albert. 
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Appendix Figure A3: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Kariba. 
Appendix Figure A5: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Cahora Bassa. 
Appendix Figure A4: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Xingkai. 
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Appendix Figure A6: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Merin. 
Appendix Figure A7: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Sargamysh. 
Appendix Figure A8: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Uvs. 
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Appendix Figure A9: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Peipsi. 
Appendix Figure A10: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Kivu. 
Appendix Figure A11: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Edward. 
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Appendix Figure A12: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Buenos Aires. 
Appendix Figure A13: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Chad. 
Appendix Figure A14: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake St. Clair. 
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Appendix Figure A15: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Champlain. 
Appendix Figure A 16: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake O'Higgins. 
Appendix Figure A 17: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Zun-Torey. 
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Appendix Figure A 18: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Rainy Lake. 
Appendix Figure A 20: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for the Caspian Sea. 
Appendix Figure A 19: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Superior. 
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Appendix Figure A21: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Victoria. 
Appendix Figure A22: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Huron. 
Appendix Figure A23: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Tanganyika. 
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Appendix Figure A24: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Malawi. 
Appendix Figure A25: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Erie. 
Appendix Figure A26: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for the Aral Sea. 
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Appendix Figure A 27: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Ontario. 
Appendix Figure A28: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Turkana. 
Appendix Figure A29: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Nasser. 
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Appendix Figure A30: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Mweru. 
Appendix Figure A31: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake of the Woods. 
Appendix Figure A32: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lago de Yacyreta. 
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Appendix Figure A33: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Itaipu. 
Appendix Figure A22: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Chilwa. 
Appendix Figure A23: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Szczecin Lagoon. 
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Appendix B: Event Analysis Figures – Related Conflict 
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Six of the 35 large transboundary lakes experienced no reported international 
water conflict that was related to the content of a prior implemented international water 
treaty. The following lakes have no reported international water conflict that is related to 
the content of the implemented international water treaties between 1990 and 2013: Lake 
Tanganyika, Lake Malawi, Lake Turkana, Lake Nasser, Lake Mweru, and Lake Itaipu.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure B1: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Tanganyika. 
Appendix Figure B2: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake 
Malawi. 
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Appendix Figure B3: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for 
Lake Turkana. 
Appendix Figure B4: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for 
Lake Nasser. 
Appendix Figure B5: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for 
Lake Mweru. 
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Eleven of the 35 large transboundary lakes in this study had reported international 
water conflict that was related to the content of a prior implemented international water 
treaty. The following large transboundary lakes have reported international water conflict 
that is related to an implemented international water treaty: Caspian Sea, Lake Superior, 
Lake Victoria, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, Aral Sea, Lake Ontario, Lake of the Woods, Lago 
de Yacyreta, Lake Chilwa, and Szczecin Lagoon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure B6: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Itaipu. 
Appendix Figure B7: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for the 
Caspian Sea. 
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Appendix Figure B8: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for 
Lake Superior. 
Appendix Figure B9: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for 
Lake Victoria. 
Appendix Figure B10: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for 
Lake Huron. 
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Appendix Figure B11: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Erie. 
Appendix Figure B12: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for the Aral Sea. 
Appendix Figure B13: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Ontario. 
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Appendix Figure B14: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake of the 
Woods. 
Appendix Figure B15: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lago de 
Yacyreta. 
Appendix Figure B16: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Lake Chilwa. 
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Appendix Figure B17: Annual international water treaties and international water conflicts for Szczecin 
Lagoon. 
134 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C: Data Imputation: Variable Summaries 
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Appendix Table C1: Variable summaries from Stata before data imputation. 
 
 
Appendix Table C2: Variable summaries from Stata after data imputation. Note all contextual variables now have 840 
observations. 
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Appendix D: Logistic Regression Stata Output 
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Appendix Figure D1: Logistic regression output from Stata. 
